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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its inception in 1930, crop insurance programs have grown from minor 
government programs to a major instrument for delivering government assistance.  
In 2008 there were 1.96 million crop insurance policies sold with a liability of $90 
billion, covering 272 million acres.  For context, the corresponding figures in 1998 
were 1.2 million policies sold with a liability of $27.9 billion, covering 182 million 
acres.  While these numbers are impressive, current levels of participation and the 
associated actuarial performance in the program have been achieved only after 
significant producer subsidies were instituted, and the program has struggled with 
low participation levels and the poor actuarial performance for the major part of its 
existence.   
          Because a broad level of participation in crop insurance is necessary for sound 
actuarial performance of the program, the factors determining participation have 
received considerable research attention.  Lack of participation is often cited as the 
result of crop insurance interactions with other risk management tools (Mahul and 
Wright, 2003), presence of government subsidies, and adverse selection.  While the 
moral hazard, adverse selection, or government assistance play an important role in 
explaining participation, there are other issues that could be important as well.  For 
example, risk perceptions of the producers might be crucial in determining crop 
insurance decisions.  If a farmer perceives that his yield is above average (both in 
terms of level and safety), he might conclude that the insurance is overpriced.  
Another factor that could influence participation is the insurance rating process.  
RMA has documented consistent complaints from farmers stating that the current 
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method for calculating APH yields and the insurance indemnity does not provide 
sufficient level of protection.   
       The purpose of this dissertation is to further examine the factors that influence 
farmers’ decisions to participate in crop insurance programs.  The factors considered 
are RMA rules and farmers’ yield perceptions.  In particular, the first paper examines 
the role of Risk Management Agency’s (RMA) APH calculation rules on the 
performance, participation, and risk protection level of actual producer history 
(APH) insurance.  The second and third papers examine the presence of behavioral 
biases, such as miscalibration and better-than-average (BTA) effect in farmers’ 
perceptions, and relate these biases to the participation.   
        Current RMA rules use a simple average of recent yields with required 
substitution of lower “plugged” yield in period absent data.  Several problems are 
likely to arise as a result of using this formula.  Because APH is a simple average 
that relies on a small number of outcomes, it is easily affected by extremes and small 
sample issues.  Also, the APH effective coverage can be misstated if small sample of 
outcomes contains several years of poor yields, or one or more years of well-above 
average yields.  Another problem involves trending yields and the process used to 
compute APH.  RMA rules ignoring trend induce an easily identified bias in 
“expected” yields.  As a result, an average of past data will result in APH values that 
are on average below the “true” expected yield.  This in turn will lead to a lower 
effective protection level than would be the case if the APH accurately depicted the 
mean of the contemporaneous yield distribution.  A related problem is induced by 
small sample variability.  Because the APH mean utilizes a relatively small number 
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of outcomes, the mean is subject to high variability and is a low-efficiency estimate.  
A simple simulation can show that even with 10 years of observation, the precision 
of the mean is likely to be significantly compromised.   The first chapter therefore 
examines the impact of the trend and of the sample size variability on the 
participation, performance, and risk protection of APH insurance.  The simulation 
model is developed with controllable “true” distributions constructed from NASS 
data for each county in Illinois, but can be easily extended for any farm-level 
situation of interest. 
         While the first paper examines the influence of RMA’s rules on the 
participation and actuarial performance, the second and third papers analyze the role 
that cognitive biases may play in insurance decisions.  Since the first papers in 
behavioral economics were published, the field of behavioral economics/finance has 
experienced tremendous growth.  Currently, there are several journals in economics 
and finance that specialize in behavioral research, and some universities teach the 
subject in advanced courses.  The results from related behavioral research indicate 
that cognitive biases influence individuals’ decision-making.  Two of the more 
commonly expressed biases are “miscalibration” (defined as systematically misstated 
correspondence between subjective and objective distributions) and the “better than 
average” (BTA) effect (defined as individuals’ tendency to maintain unrealistically 
positive assessment of one’s skills and abilities, especially in relation to peer group).  
These two possibilities are examined in this dissertation. 
          The second and third papers examine producers’ yield perceptions and relate 
them to their behavior.  Both papers use data from the crop yield risk survey (CYRS) 
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developed under a cooperative agreement with RMA and the University of Illinois.  
Conducted in 2002, this survey covers corn and soybean producers from Indiana, 
Iowa, and Illinois.  The survey underwent an extensive reviewing process by 
University personnel and economists from the Economic Research Service of USDA.  
It elicited information on demographics, risk management, risk attributes and 
perceptions, and the conjoint ranking of insurance products and attributes.     
        The second chapter examines the relationship between risk perceptions and crop 
insurance by linking the BTA effect and miscalibration to crop insurance purchases.    
Following numerous publications that showed the BTA effect and miscalibration 
influence decision making and arguing that farming is likely to promote the BTA 
effect, this chapter investigates whether the BTA effect systematically biases 
farmers’ participation decisions.  If a farmer believes that his/her farming skills are 
above average, he/she may conclude that he/she is likely to outperform others and 
consequently “average” priced insurance will be relatively less attractive.  This 
hypothesis was tested by using crop participation as a dependent variable and 
subjective yield perceptions as independent variables.   The analysis was 
implemented on an individual product level (yield, revenue and CAT insurance) and 
across all products.   
          The third paper examines the role of different elicitation formats on the 
subjective perception by analyzing correspondence between yield perceptions and 
county yield distribution.  The subjective yield perceptions were elicited under two 
different formats, directly and indirectly.  Both directly and indirectly-stated 
subjective yields were compared to the county yields.  If one of these formats 
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displays systematic differences from county-level yields, the argument can be made 
that the elicitation approach substantially influences the measures of risk recovered 
from producers, therefore further confounding efforts to design attractive and effect 
insurance products.    
 Overall, this dissertation presents interesting findings about the role of 
perceptions and RMA’s rules on the participation.  The findings from the papers 
illustrate that the current RMA’s rules reduce protection level, participation, and 
performance of the APH insurance.  The dissertation also illustrates that, behavioral 
biases, while present, do not reverse directional effects in insurance purchase 
decisions, but only affect extent and intensity.  Finally, it is know that the probability 
conviction elicitation framework provides more accurate results than direct yield 
elicitation.   
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 CHAPTER 1 
Effect of Rules for Calculating APH on the Performance of APH 
Insurance 
 
Abstract 
The Risk Management Agency’s rules for calculating a farmer’s Actual 
Production History (APH) yield create several problems for crop 
insurance users.  APH calculations ignore trend, are severely affected by 
extreme values, and do not vary with the length of the observed history.  
This study investigates the impact of these rules on the risk protection, 
participation incentives, and actuarial performance by using a simulation 
model with controllable “true” yield distributions. Existing rating 
methods lead to a bias which results in wide differences in implied 
subsidy impacts, variations across production regions, and reduce 
incentives for participation.   
 
Crop insurance products have become increasingly popular among farmers. In 2008 
approximately 1.96 million of crop insurance policies were sold with a liability of 
$90 billion covering 272 million acres of land compared to 1.2 million policies were 
sold with a liability of $27.9 billion covering 182 million acres.  The most popular 
crop insurance products (such as actual production history, crop revenue coverage, 
and revenue assurance) have covered 81% of insured acres in 2006.  Calculation of 
product guarantees and premium rates for these products depended on producers’ 
actual production history (APH) yields (Carriquiry, Babcock, Hart, 2005). In general 
terms, under individual yield guarantee crop contracts, a farmer is eligible for 
indemnity if the actual farm yield is less than the yield guarantee specified in the 
contract. A grower can select the guarantee as a percentage (coverage level) of 
historical average yield (4 to 10 years) the actual production history, and the 
coverage levels range from 50% to 85% in 5% increments. A before-subsidy 
premium for the insurance is the product of the yield guarantee, a price set by RMA, 
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and the RMA established premium rate, provided that actual yield is below the 
guarantee. The indemnity is the difference between the yield guarantee and the actual 
yield times the price set by RMA.   
          The rules for calculating a farmer’s Actual Production History (APH) are 
straightforward, and are intended to provide a simple mechanism to predict a 
farmer’s yield-risk exposure while limiting the incidence of adverse selection and 
other rating problems. In essence, the current rule uses a simple average of recent 
yields (4 to 10 years) with required substitution of lower “plugged” yields for 
missing observations. No attempt is made to reflect yield trends, nor any attempt to 
reflect systematic and observable differences from expected production evident in 
area yields.  Instead, APH relies exclusively on an individual’s own available yield 
history and adjusted county yields to replace missing data. 
          The paper examines the impact of the RMA’s rules for calculating Actual 
Production History (APH) yields on the implied degree of risk protection, on 
participation, and on the actuarial performance of crop insurance across a set of 
conditions that represent the experience of a wide set of farms in Illinois. The 
analysis uses a simulation model with controllable “true” distributions constructed 
from NASS data for each county in Illinois scaled to reflect farm-level conditions 
based on information from a broad set of farms enrolled in the Farm Business Farm 
Management record keeping association (FBFM). To assess the actuarial 
implications, the iFARM crop insurance evaluation program is used1.  
          The paper identifies the directional impacts and implications for risk 
protections afforded by yield insurance under the existing rules.  It demonstrates that 
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both sample size variability and trend omission can have serious consequences on 
participation decisions and risk protection.  In particular, ignoring trend reduces risk 
protection afforded by crop insurance (by introducing a lag in yields), and sample 
size variability compromises the APH mean precision.  While these results are 
consistent with findings by Skees and Reed (1986), Carriquiry et al. (2005), the 
paper contributes to the literature by modeling trend and sample size variability 
simultaneously and doing so to examine the impact under the RMA premium rating 
structure.  The paper finds significant differences between actuarial costs and RMA 
premiums and identifies the reasons for the discrepancies.  The study also provides a 
simple approach to adjust for the trend that would clearly and easily improve the 
individual performance of crop insurance, and contribute to newly emerging 
suggestions for improving APH style insurance.  
Background 
 Currently the APH insurable yields and rates are calculated using at least four and 
up to ten years of farm-level yields.  If less than 4 years of yield data are available, 
adjusted transition yields (which are county yields times a certain percentage), 
known as t-yields are used as “plug-in” values in the farmer’s history.  If the farmer 
has more than 10 years of data, the most distant observations are ignored. 
Importantly, RMA develops all insurance rates by county regardless of the 
differences in participation rates, production intensities, and existing payout 
experiences. RMA examines loss cost ratios (LCR - the ratio of indemnity to 
liability) adjusted to 65% coverage level using liability dollar values for the last 20 
or more years starting in 1975. To reduce the impact of a single year, RMA caps its 
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individual loss cost ratios at the 80th percentile of the historic LCR and distributes 
the excess across all counties in a state (Josephson, Lord, and Mitchell, 2001). RMA 
calculates a county insurance rate as a weighted average (weights are not disclosed) 
of a given county LCR and circle LCR (an average of surrounding counties LCR).  
The averaging is done to increase the predictive value of the loss ratio (Josephson, 
Lord and Mitchell, 2001). The county insurance rate is known as the base county 
unloaded rate. The base rate is then adjusted by APH, reference yields, and fixed rate 
loading:  
 
          
 
Exponentail
APH Yield
Base Rate County Unloaded Rate Fixed Rate Loading
Reference Yield
 
= + 
 
  (1)    
where  
APH  is the actual production history, or average of 4 to 10 individual farm-level 
yields, 
Reference Yield is the yield set by RMA intended to reflect an average yield index 
for a given county,  
Exponential  is the an exponential factor to control for “yield variability 
differences”.2 and 
Fixed rate loading is the provision for catastrophic losses. 
           Two implicit assumptions become clear when examining the base rate 
formula. First, RMA treats all APH yields the same, regardless of number of years 
used to calculate the average.   Yet, samples based on shorter time periods tend to be 
more variable.  Secondly, no adjustments for the trend are made despite increasing 
yield levels across crops and regions. 
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           Since yields exhibit an upward trend, the calculated APH yield is likely to lag 
the expected yield.  Consider a farmer with 10-year APH of 109 bu/acre but with an 
expected yield due to increasing technology of 120 bu/acre.  At 75% coverage level, 
the APH insurance would cover 82 bu/acre (109 x 75%) rather than 90 bu/acre.  
Skees and Reed recognized this effect and argued that “either RMA must attempt to 
adjust APH yields for trends or they must reduce their rates to reflect the actual level 
of coverage provided when trends are not adjusted”. Depending on the nature of the 
underlying yield generating process, a significant probability mass could occur 
between 82 and 90 bu/acre.   
          To examine the simultaneous impact of trend and sample size variability on 
APH yield, consider figure 1.1.  The figure illustrates the relationship between APH 
and the expected (“true”) yield distribution. The figure depicts 5,000 simulated 4- 
and 10-year APH yields with mean on the x-axis and standard deviation on y axis.  
The figure illustrates the role of sample variations due to sample size on a 
representative farm’s APH estimate. The simulation was constructed for a 
representative case farm from Christian County, Illinois by first detrending corn 
yields, fitting the resulting data to a Weibull distribution, and then simulating sets of 
yields of various sample lengths, re-applying the trend and then calculating the 
resulting APH mean and standard deviations for 4- and 10-year periods.3 The figure 
highlights the potential variability in the mean and provides a sense of the rate at 
which variability decreases as more observation/years are added, and how the mean 
bias is affected by the sample length. In general, the shorter samples provide better 
estimates of mean and worse estimates of variability.  For example, the true 
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(expected) mean and standard deviation for the representative farm in this is example 
is 174 bu/ac and 24 bu/ac (shown as red and black lines in color-printed versions, 
light and dark otherwise).  The ten year APH yield has a mean of 164 bu/ac and 
standard deviation of 24 bu/ac, while 4 year APH yield has a mean of 167 bu/ac and 
standard deviation of 22 bu/ac.  Given additional incentives for farmers to self-select 
based on their yield experience, either because of the trend, or because of the 
abnormal yields, the precision of the APH estimate is likely to be further 
compromised. The figure also illustrates another potential problem a possible 
dependence between lower moments. Figure 1.1 displays this effect in the “clouds” 
whose points move up and to the left relative to the “true” data generation process 
used (i.e. there a possible inverse relationship between standard deviation and mean). 
          Farmers have repeatedly voiced concerns about the inability of the APH to 
adequately represent their yield risk exposure.  They argue that the insurance 
provides inadequate protection when they experience several consecutive years of 
low yields because the APH in this case does not accurately reflect farmers’ future 
risk, leading to adverse selection incentives. The implication is that their yield 
histories make insurance too expensive and provide inadequate levels of protection, 
or simply transfer subsidies non-uniformly and inequitably.  Because the APH can be 
affected by extreme values, there is an incentive to report only higher values, or to 
“switch” reporting units to take advantage of favorable, but random, yield variations. 
Consistent with this observation, anecdotal evidence suggests that farmers tend to 
switch insurance agents and “forget” somewhat distant bad years when applying for 
crop insurance (Rejesus and Lovell 2003).  RMA has defended its insurance rating 
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and pricing practices by arguing that under constant yield trends, stable yield 
distributions, uniform participation, the current practices would lead to coverage 
level selections that would misstate true coverage by a constant amount and the rates 
would likewise adjust themselves through time.  RMA also has stated that even 
though the insurance premiums are set and a final pricing algorithm is available, the 
specific mechanisms are intentionally undisclosed to prevent or dissuade moral 
hazard and adverse selection.  
         Concerns about the role of the APH calculation on the performance of crop 
insurance have become so well-known that the Risk Management Agency (RMA) 
noted it is “the most frequent and consistent concern heard from producers” (U.S. 
Congress, Subcommittee on General Farm Commodities and Risk Management of 
the Committee on Agriculture, 2004).  In April 2004, RMA requested proposals for 
alternative methods for mitigating declines in approved yields due to successive 
years of low yields. RMA’s administrator noted that the goals of request for such a 
proposal were to find “…approaches to establishing approved APH yields that are 
less subject to decreases during successive years of low yields as compared to 
current procedures…”(U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Subcommittee on 
General Farm Commodities and Risk Management of the Committee on Agriculture 
2006).  RMA’s implicit recognition of the problems with the rating methodologies 
remains at odds with their defense and continued use of the existing approaches.  A 
need for research to clarify the impacts and to identify potential improvements is 
evident. Also, figure 1.1 highlights the error in logic of the implicit in the rules idea 
that longer sample period should be a better estimator of the central tendency.  
 13 
          In addition, trend and sample size variability issues may be interrelated.  It has 
been postulated that advancements in seed technology and disease control have 
altered the underlying yield generating process through time. These genetic 
improvements might have increased the trend, reduced the yield variance, or simply 
changed the relationship between mean and variability.  In particular, recent 
advances in genetic technology and “bio-traits” have resulted in what many call yield 
acceleration or a quantum jump in trend.  Cursory examination of NASS state level 
average corn yields seems to confirm this, as the state linear trend is 0.9 bu./acre for 
the time period from 1973 to 1983, 2.15 bu./acre for the time period from 1984 to 
1994, and 3.94 bu./acre from 1995 to 2005.  While additional time and data are 
required to confirm this effect, the possibility would further exacerbate the problems 
with existing ratings methodologies4 (i.e. farmers who use seeds with bio-traits and 
pay “average” RMA premiums might be overcharged). 
Literature Review 
This section examines previous work on trend and sample variability issues, and the 
relationship between RMA premiums and actuarial costs.  The literature related to 
the impact of trend and variability on the APH estimation is fairly direct in its 
implications.  While both trend and sample size variability issues have been 
examined, the references remain limited.  Skees and Reed (1986) were among the 
first to point out that when the yield trend is present, the expected yield will be 
higher than the APH yield. Using farm-level data from Illinois and Kentucky corn 
and soybean producers, they regressed standard deviations and yield coefficient of 
variations on mean yield.  They calculated a theoretical (actuarially fair) insurance 
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rate as a function of yield and showed that the rates calculated under trend-adjusted 
yields are consistently higher than the rates calculated under APH yield.  They 
further argued that RMA needs to introduce the rate adjustments for the trend.  They 
concluded that the rules are likely to lead to adverse selections since farmers with 
high yields are less likely to receive indemnity payments, and the trend omission is 
likely to result in lower indemnity payments.  However, the authors did not examine 
the impact from different base period APH yields and did not consider how the trend 
omission influences the rates calculated under the RMA’s premium structure.   
         Barnett, Black, Hu, and Skees (2005) provided a brief theoretical argument 
concerning the magnitude of the sample size error. Using a statistical rule stating that 
the standard error of the estimate is the ratio of standard deviation of the true 
underlying distribution to the square root of the sample’s size, they showed that the 
samples with more observations should have a better precision.  However, this rule is 
true for detrended yields, since the presence of trend is likely to comprise yield mean 
precision.   Carriquiry et al. (2005) argued that since farmers whose past yields were 
above expected yields were more likely to participate in crop insurance (they called 
this a sampling error), the current rules for APH calculation were likely to lead to 
adverse selection.  This results because the sampling error would lead to higher loss-
to-cost ratios, and as a result, to higher insurance premiums.  They used detrended 
farm- and county-level corn yields from Iowa farmers to model the impact of 
sampling error and suggested an alternative estimator to minimize the error. The 
results showed that estimated ratio of APH indemnities to actuarially fair insurance 
premiums is greater than 1 with and without adverse selection.  The results also 
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showed that the return to crop insurance decreases as number of years in the APH 
period increases.  A limitation of their work is that they used detrended yields5, 
implicitly ignoring the relationship between trends and sample size variability.  In 
addition, their comparison relied on actuarially fair premiums, while RMA employs 
a complex rating structure that is likely to violate the assumption of actuarial fairness. 
          Zanini, Sherrick, Schnitkey, and Irwin (2001) examined yield probabilities, 
actuarially-fair premiums, and RMA premiums under 5 different parametric 
distributions.  They used farm-level data from 26 corn and soybean producers in 12 
Illinois counties.  They detrended yields using linear trend, and fitted Weibull, 
normal, lognormal, beta, and logistic distributions.  They compared actuarially fair 
payments under various distributions and found that beta and Weibull distributions 
provide the most accurate measure of payments.  They reported values for both 
premiums, and the calculated simple (unweighted) average ratio of actuarially fair 
payments, and found that on average RMA premiums exceed actuarially fair 
premiums by 3.3 times6.  They also compared the actuarially fair payments to RMA 
premiums and found no correlations between the two.  They concluded stating “the 
results raise questions about the efficacy of crop insurance rating procedures. In 
particular, if actual premiums are not closely correlated with expected payments, the 
significant problems in controlling payout ratios would be expected.”     
          Some of the inconsistencies empirically observed by research in crop 
insurance can be linked to the issues of trend and sample size variability. A report by 
the integrated Financial Analytics and Research (iFAR) for the Illinois Corn 
Marketing Board analyzed the loss ratios Illinois corn and soybean producers. The 
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report noted that the loss ratios for corn and soybean have been well below RMA’s 
benchmark target ratios and that distribution of loss ratios is clearly not uniform.  
The primary corn producing regions have much lower loss ratios (average loss ratio 
for all crops from 1995 to 2005 are 0.52 for Illinois), than the areas in the fringes of 
the corn belt.  Such loss ratios imply that the farmers in these areas pay higher 
premiums per unit of risk when compared to farmers from other states and regions. 
The report lists possible explanations for the observed loss ratios emphasizing the 
presence of high relative yield trends in corn and soybeans.  Further, the report 
argues that “yield acceleration” can create a situation where ratings based on 
historical yields will overstate the premiums through understated coverage, stating 
that “cursory examination verify that crops with higher rates of trend increase have 
had lower loss ratios” by tabulating similar loss performance data across major crops.    
  The existing literature illustrates following gap in existing research.  While 
Skees and Reed (1986) examined the role of trend on the participation and Carriquiry 
et al. (2005) examined the impact of sample size error, neither investigated trend and 
sample size variability jointly.  Since both trend and sample size variability impact 
yield estimates simultaneously, they need to be examined jointly.  Further, most of 
the literature examined the impact from trend omission and sample size variability 
on actuarially fair rates.  In reality, farmers are charged RMA premiums, and RMA 
premiums are not actuarially fair.  Therefore, the impact of trend and sample size 
variability needs to be examined under RMA’s premium structure.     
 
 
 17 
Empirical Approach  
The analysis presented is performed for a case farm in each county in Illinois to 
illustrate how the results differ among regions that vary in average productivity, 
variability, and under different insurance premium rate structures. The steps in used 
in the empirical model are shown in figure 1.2.  To create a representative farm in 
each county, the county-level yield data for the period 1972 to 2005 (NASS) were 
detrended to a base year of 2006 using a linear time trend7 (2006 was chosen to be 
consistent with the premium calculation algorithms used)8 and the mean and standard 
deviation for each county were calculated (step 1).  Because the farm-level yields are 
more variable than county yields, the standard deviations were scaled up to represent 
the difference between county and farm level data using an empirical relationship to 
actual farmer data from farms enrolled in the Illinois Farm Business Farm 
Management record-keeping system.  The county-level standard deviations were 
multiplied by the average ratio of farm to county standard deviations,9 and a method 
of moments’ estimator then used to fit Weibull distribution to recover the implied 
farm-level yield distribution.10       
          The county trend was added back to the representative farm distributions for 
each county to create the data generating process used in the simulations.  
Specifically, these distributions were used to estimate probabilities of reaching 
expected yields (true probabilities) (step 4) and to generate pseudo datasets of 
varying lengths (from 4 to 10 years) (step 5). For convenience, @Risk11 was used to 
generate the pseudodata and Monte Carlo simulations were run, with 10,00012 
iterations, to generate the sets of samples for the insurance evaluation phase of the 
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study.  The data were generated for representative farms in each Illinois county, and 
the probabilities of reaching target yields under various scenarios estimated. Because 
the representative farms differ in trends, mean, and standard deviation by county, the 
model allows examination of the impact of these variables on the probability of 
reaching different indemnified yields. Also, the model allows examining 
probabilities across the counties, and for various sample periods.  
          To facilitate the explanation of the information presented, consider figure 1.3. 
The figure shows two corn yield distributions for the case farm in Adams County, 
Illinois.  The continuous line denotes true or expected yield distribution; the dashed 
line shows the distribution for the 10-year APH mean at a 0.85 coverage level. The 
difference in the means between the representative distribution and the APH mean 
distribution illustrates the bias induced by ignoring the trend. The graph also shows 
the probabilities of receiving indemnity under the 10-year APH yield and under true 
or expected yield distributions.  The probability is shown as area to the left of the 
dashed line that separates the lower left tail of the distribution.  Since the area under 
the case farm is smaller than the area under the 10-year APH, the probability of 
receiving the indemnity is smaller under the representative yield distribution.  Higher 
levels of coverage are needed under the APH-mean yield distribution to provide the 
same level of protection as warranted by the true yield distribution. 
          In step 6 (figure 1.2), we calculate actuarial costs and examine the role of 
existing rules on the actuarial cost and expected participation.  In step 7, the actual 
premiums (under RMA’s “black box” approach for determining the coefficients) 
were recovered to examine the impact of trend, sample size variability, and number 
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of years in the sample, on the RMA’s premiums.  Figure 1.4 illustrates RMA’s 
premium calculation for the hypothetical corn farm in Adams County with an APH 
yield of 168 bu./acre, coverage level of 85%, and $4.50 /bu contract price.  The 
calculation starts with estimating guarantee per acre (product of APH yield and 
coverage level), liability (premium guarantee times price election), yield ratio, and 
preliminary base rate.  The rate is then adjusted for coverage level and the subsidy.   
            The premiums calculated under RMA’s algorithm were compared to the 
actuarial cost under the simulated data.  Since RMA uses empirical crop losses to 
derive the rates, it believes that there should be no difference between a large scale 
simulation cost and the stated rates.  Thus the differences imply unintended impacts 
of the methods used to arrive at the APH or simply ratings mistakes.   The approach 
in this study allows an isolation of the role of the APH portion of the difference 
between actual and actuarially fair rates. 
Results  
Table 1.1 presents results for six selected counties and the state by comparing the 
impact on true and APH implied probabilities from counties’ representative farms13.  
It also implicitly illustrates the relationship between sample moments and the 
likelihood and frequency of APH payments relative to “true” (expected), given the 
existing rules of the APH calculation. The results are presented in 5% coverage level 
increments, for APH mean yields calculated from sets of 4, 7, and 10 years. The first 
column shows county mean, standard deviation, and trend.  The third labeled “True 
Prob” column presents the probability of reaching a particular yield level under 
farm-level representative “true distributions” for a given coverage level. For example, 
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in Jefferson County, the probability of a yield outcome under the “true” distribution 
is 3.05% for the 0.55 coverage level, and 24.76% for the 0.85 coverage level. The 
column labeled “APH implied probability” presents the probability for reaching a 
particular yield level at the associated coverage level given the sample period and 
implied yield under the existing rules for calculating the APH. To gauge the relative 
impact of the APH sample period, a column labeled “Prob Ratio” is provided, 
containing a ratio of implied APH probability to the “True Prob” probability. This 
ratio shows the fraction of the actual protection provided by APH mean given true 
probability, coverage level, and time period.  For example, for Jefferson County, 
under 0.55 coverage level, the mean value is 91.97%, under a 4-year sample period. 
In other words, the protection level provided by 4-year APH level is reduced by 8% 
as a result of using the APH mean rather than the true mean.  The actual protection 
level decreases as the coverage level increases, but the magnitude is small (91.97% 
for 0.55 coverage level, compared to 89.93% for the 0.85 coverage level).  
          The probability ratio, however, is influenced by the number of years in the 
APH sample period.  For Jefferson County, for example, the ratio decreases from 
91.97% (0.55 coverage level, 4-year APH) to 71.31% (0.55 coverage level, 10-year 
APH).  In effect, the protection level is reduced by 20% as the years in the base 
period increase from 4 to 10. The pattern of relative probabilities is also influenced 
importantly by trend. For instance, in Lee County where the trend is higher, the 
impact is more pronounced with the relative probability decreasing at 0.85 coverage 
level from 81.15% with 4 year coverage to 55.92% with 10 year coverage.  Shifting 
to the state level, the protection level is reduced by 24%, (from 88.23% for 0.55 
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coverage level and 4 year APH to 64.82% for 10 year APH same coverage level).  
To the extent that rational producers respond to these differences, the implications of 
the findings are clear.  Use of APH yields decreases the probability of participation, 
and the longer the number of years in the base period the less likely is the 
participation decision.  The results on interaction between APH yields and trend are 
similar to results in Skees and Reed (1986) who showed that theoretical insurance 
rates for trend-adjusted yields are always greater than the rates for APH yields and 
argued that an adjustment is needed to prevent an adverse participation incentive. 
          If a farmer has experienced several years of abnormally high (low) yields, his 
APH yield is likely to be greater (less) than his expected yield.  In this situation, a 
farmer is more likely to purchase crop insurance.  This is an example of adverse 
selection, and to model this propensity, a measure “participation prob” was 
developed.  For every iteration, a value of 1 was given if the APH sample yield was 
greater than the actual expected yield, and zero otherwise.  Averaged across all 
iterations, the measure provides a farmer’s “pure participation probability” that arises 
from experiencing several abnormal yield years that favorably classifies his yields 
relative to true.  The value of the probability can be indicative of the extent and 
severity of adverse selection.  For example, in Jefferson County, for 4 year APH 
yield, this value is 36.59% indicating that there is a 36.59% chance that a given APH 
mean will actually be greater than the true (expected) yield. As the number of years 
in the base period increases from 4 years to 10, the probability decreases to 14.75%. 
This decrease is due to the lag introduced by trend, where APH yield lags expected 
yield so significantly that even random positive changes in yields are not large 
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enough to compensate for the lag.  The probability differs across the counties due to 
the interaction between trend and dispersion in yield, with lower trends and shorter 
sample variability; it ranges from 33.21% for Macon, and 28.74% for Lee (4 year 
APH mean).  At the state level, the participation probability is 33.55% for 4 year 
APH versus 10.15% for 10 year APH.  High participation probability further 
illustrates low efficiency of the APH estimate, and illustrates the impact of extreme 
yield values on the APH yield. 
RMA Premium Calculations   
To examine the impact from trend and yield variability in a economic context, the 
actual premium algorithm used by RMA14 was implemented to construct actual 
premiums for each case farm.  The model simply inputs true and simulated APH 
yields into RMA’s pricing algorithm and compares the resulting impacts.  The 
algorithm calculates the actual price quoted to a farmer who wants to buy crop 
insurance for each county using RMA’s technical coefficients and simulated APH 
and true means.  Figure 1.4 replicates RMA’s insurance pricing algorithm for a 
hypothetical corn producer in Adams County that has an APH yield of 168 bu/ac, 
selects 85% coverage level, with $4.5/bu contract price.  The subsidized premium is 
equal to $33.24 per acre; the unsubsidized premium is equal to $53.62 per acre.  
Table 1.2 shows average, before subsidy, premium values for 0.85 coverage level15 
for selected counties across the same APH base periods of 4, 7, and 10 years as were 
in table 1.1.  The table shows trend, true probability, APH mean, RMA premiums for 
4, 7, 10 years and true yield.  The results indicate that as the number of years in the 
base period increases, the premium values increase as well but the change in the 
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values is small.  In Christian County, for example, the difference between true dollar 
premium and estimated dollar premium (10-year APH base period) is only $0.25 
($28.87 minus $29.63) for an APH difference of 12 bushels.  At the state level, the 
difference of 7 bushels translates into premium difference of $0.90.   
          The insensitivity of the RMA insurance premiums to the changes in APH 
yields is somewhat alarming, since RMA uses APH yield as an indicator for farm 
yield variability.  Such low sensitivity to APH yield could also potentially lead to 
adverse selection, since originally APH yield was used as a proxy for the yield 
variability and the premium values for the low and high APH yield do not seem to 
differ substantially.  One possible reason for low yield sensitivity could be the 
provision for catastrophic losses used in ratemaking process.  This loading is fixed, 
and given high spatial correlation in yields is likely to be significant.  This claim is 
examined later in the chapter. 
Actuarial Implications of Trend and Small Sample Variability of APH  
Actual premiums are relatively insensitive to changes in the APH, and may not be 
suitable to summarize the actuarial performance differences that exist in practice.  As 
a consequence, true actuarial costs are also calculated. The indemnity function can 
be specified as [ ]max 0,k y p− , where k is coverage level times APH yield, y is 
realized yield; and p is the indemnity price per bushel in the insurance contract. The 
actuarially fair (expected) value of the contract can be calculated by Monte Carlo 
integration and written as: 
0
( ) ( )
k
V p k y f y dy= −∫      (2) 
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where f(y) is the yield probability density function. 
         This framework provides the mechanism for calculating the actuarial values 
and examines how the changes in underlying yield exposure and sample size 
variability affect the fair values. These values and their changes across underlying 
yield distributions can then be compared to the premiums calculated by RMA to 
identify the effect of trend, sample period, and other variables. To make results 
easily interpreted, the indemnity price is fixed at $4.50 and all results are presented 
relative to that price.  
        Table 1.3 contains a summary of the actuarial costs for yield insurance across 
the same representative counties, for the 0.85 coverage level that was chosen to be 
consistent with RMA premium estimations.  As shown, the actuarial costs are more 
responsive to the trend and base period changes than the actual premiums.  For 
example, in Christian County, the cost decreases by $1.87 (from $7.11 for 4 year 
APH to $5.24 for 10 year APH) as the number of years in the base period increases 
due to the reduction in coverage provided.  The magnitude provides direct 
implications for the cost of the insurance program relative to actual premiums for 
different sample. For counties with lower trends, the impact, or decrease in actual 
costs is smaller. For Jefferson County (trend =1.3 bu/acre/year) the actuarial cost 
decreases by $2.84 (from $14.54 to $11.70) as the number of years in the base period 
increases, again despite the fact that the actual premiums paid would be unchanged 
for the farmer.   
          More interestingly, the actuarial costs are substantially smaller than 
unsubsidized premiums calculated in table 1.2.  To facilitate the discussion, the 
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RMA premiums from table 1.2 and actuarial costs from table 1.3 are combined in 
table 1.4 with the ratio of RMA premiums to actuarial costs.  The ratios for all APH 
base periods and for true (expected) yield premiums are greater than 2, and the ratios 
decrease as number of years in APH yield decrease, reflecting the lag introduced by 
trend.  For instance, the ratio for 10 year APH yield ranges from 3.8 for Macon 
County to 7.2 for Ogle County, and is equal to 3.8 at the state level.  The ratio for 4 
year APH yield ranges from 2.8 for Macon County to 5.2 for Ogle County, and is 
equal to 3 at the state level.  Using true (expected) yields, the ratio is 2.0 for Macon 
County, 3.5 for Ogle County, and 2.2 at the state level.  The premiums shown are for 
0.85 coverage level, which currently has a subsidy level of 35%.  After adjusted for 
the subsidy, the ratios will be 35% smaller, but still greater than one.  The ratios 
calculated are in line with ratios obtained by Sherrick et al. (2004a), which ranged 
from 1.3 to 7.6, with an average, unweighted value being equal to 3.3.   
         The reason for discrepancy between the actuarial and RMA premiums could lie 
in RMA’s approach towards premium calculation.  The actuarial cost calculated in 
table 1.3 does not have a loading for catastrophe events (catastrophe rate).  Since 
yields losses tend to be spatially correlated, catastrophic provisions are likely to play 
a significant role in determining premium value.  To examine the premiums and the 
cost on more comparable basis, the RMA premium values are re-calculated by 
setting catastrophic provision equal to zero.  The results are shown in table 1.5, 
which compares RMA premiums without catastrophic provision to actuarial costs 
and also provides the ratios of RMA’s premiums to actuarial costs.  The RMA 
premiums without catastrophic loading are significantly smaller than the premiums 
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with loading.  For example, the premium for 4 year APH yield in Christian County is 
only $14.87 compared to $29.36 (the premium with catastrophic provision in table 4).  
At the state level, the same premium is $22.28 compared to $37.96.  The ratios are 
significantly smaller as well, they are near 2 for 4 year APH yields (4 with 
catastrophic loading in table 1.4), and near 3 for 10 year APH (6 with catastrophic 
loading in table 1.4).  At true (expected) yield levels, the ratio is close to 1.  The 
results from the table suggest that the major reason for higher RMA premiums lies in 
the catastrophic provision which seems to explain the significant differences between 
the premiums and actuarial costs.  Nonetheless, even after controlling for the 
catastrophic provision, the ratios of the premiums to actuarial costs are still 
significantly greater than one, reflecting the significant effect of the trend-introduced 
lag.          
Results after Trend Adjustment   
Assuming linear trend, the bias in the mean induced by ignoring trend can be 
expressed as ( 1) / 2nβ− + , where n  is number of years in APH base period, and β  is 
yield trend.  Here, we adjust for the trend bias using 4-year APH yields, and 
calculate APH implied probabilities, RMA premiums, and actuarial costs.  The 
results are shown in table 1.6.  The table also shows 4-year APH yield, 4-year trend 
adjusted APH yield, and true (expected) yield.   For example, for Christian county 4-
year APH yield is 167 bu/ac, however, when adjusted for trend, the yield increases to 
171 bu/ac, which is about 3 bu/ac smaller than the true (expected) yield of 174 bu/ac.  
APH implied probability increases from approximately 12% for 4 year APH to 14% 
for when adjusted for trend.  This value is close to the APH implied probability of 
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14%.  There is a small reduction in premiums due to the APH trend adjustment for 
Christian county.  The premium decreases from $29.36 to $29.12, which is greater 
than the RMA’s insurance premium under expected yield of $28.87.  Finally, 
actuarial cost increase from $7.11 to $9.20 due to the trend adjustment, with the 
actuarial cost under true (expected) yield equal to $9.99.  The adjustment improves 
the protection level provided by APH insurance.  It should also limit incentives to 
report only recent yields, thus improving the APH mean precision (by reducing lag 
introduced by the trend), reducing the negative impacts from sample size variability, 
and potentially improving actuarial performance by limiting adverse selection.  
Finally, note that suggested adjustment is relatively straightforward to implement, as 
it does not require changing RMA’s current rating structure.        
Scaler Sensitivity 
 In constructing county representative farms, we adjusted county-level yield 
variability by the scaler (1.245) to make the county yields as variable as farm-level 
yields.  This ratio, while unbiased, remains subject to sample variation.  To provide a 
sense of its importance, we assess the sensitivity of presented results to different 
scaler values.  Table 1.7 contains estimates of the ratio of APH implied probabilities 
to the probabilities obtained under true yield presented in table 1.1.  Table 1.7 
replicates the ratio under for values of 1.15, 1.2, 1.245 (base), 1.3, and 1.  The ratio 
steadily increases as the scaler value increases from 1 (county average yield standard 
deviation) to 1.35.  For example, for Christian county, the ratio increases from 52% 
to 63%; at the state level the ratio increases from 56% to 67%.  Arbitrary assuming 
that the true scaler value lies between 1.15 to 1.35, the absolute level of error is 6 
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points at county level (67% minus 61%) or relative error is within 9% (6 points 
divided by 64%).  Thus, despite the fact that the scaling approach is subject to error, 
it provides a strong sense of the magnitude of the most likely effect.      
Summary and Conclusions  
The current rules used to calculate a farmer’s APH yield are likely to result in 
substantial departures from actuarial values, providing unintended incentives for 
participation. Since the rules utilize an average based on a limited number of actual 
farm observations, the resulting estimate is heavily influenced by extreme yield 
observations.  This influence is likely to lead to non-uniform impacts on probabilities 
in indemnified ranges of farmers’ yield distributions. Due to the fact that the APH 
yield is used in the calculation of yield guarantees and rates for the most popular 
crop insurance products, the impact of the discussed problems is likely to affect large 
number of farmers. We examine the impact of current RMA rules on a degree of risk 
protection afforded by crop insurance, on participation incentives, and on the 
actuarial performance of APH crop insurance. The approach utilized a simulation 
model with controllable “true” distributions for each county in Illinois.  Unlike 
previous research, the paper models trend and sample size variability impact jointly 
and examines the impact on actuarial costs and RMA premiums.  
         The results show the degree to which trends and sample size variability affect 
the probabilities of reaching yield levels indemnified from lagged yield samples, 
affect premiums, and actuarial costs of the actual versus APH implied distribution. 
At the state level, the protection level afforded by the insurance drops by 21% as the 
base period increases from 4 years to 10 years, and the counties with the high trend 
 29 
tend to experience larger drops.  The results also show that RMA premiums are not 
highly influenced by actual APH yield changes.  The findings suggested the large 
differences between RMA premiums and actuarial costs are mostly due to the 
catastrophic loading and lag in yields introduced by the trend.  All these findings 
have negative implications for the participation and actuarial costs.   
        We introduce the trend adjustment to correct the lag in the APH yields using 
county trend.  The adjustment improves the protection level provided by APH 
insurance and should limit incentives to report only recent yields.  The adjustment 
seems to improve the APH mean precision, reduce the negative impacts from sample 
size variability, and possibly improve actuarial performance by limiting adverse 
selection.   
        Future research should examine spatial methods for calculating trend since 
trend and yield variability issues seem to have spatial implications, and spatial 
methods might lead to a better way to aggregate yields geographically.  Another 
potentially fruitful direction for research would be to examine impact of technology 
on the trend and variability.  If trends have accelerated in the last decade and 
variance decreased, the current premiums are likely to be mispriced, since the current 
rating structure does not take into account these developments.      
Endnotes  
 
1 The iFARM Crop Insurance Evaluation provides an evaluation of alternative crop 
insurance choices for the case farm in the county and for the crop selected. The case 
farm is intended to reflect conditions of a typical farm in each county and is based on 
data from NASS, farm recordkeeping associations, and research at the University of 
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Illinois relating farm to county yields. The iFARM calculator is available at 
http://www.farmdoc.uiuc.edu/cropins/index.asp 
2 The exponential factor is an adjustment to reflect the inverse relationship between 
APH yield and yield variability. Skees and Reed (1986) pointed out that the averages 
of farm-level yields can be used as an (observable, but inaccurate) indicator of farm-
level yield variability. The RMA has nine discrete values for exponential factors that 
are calculated by spreading county rates over a range of average yields using 
proportional spanning procedures (Goodwin 1994). This factor ensures 
(theoretically) that farmers who have APH above reference yield pay less in 
premiums. 
3 Christian County has a true mean of 174 bu/ac and a standard deviation of 24 bu/ac. 
While a wide range of mean and standard deviations can be observed, Christian 
County was selected to show the impact in what can be viewed as a county with low 
trend. 
4 Nonetheless, RMA has accepted the notion that particular biotech traits reduce 
insurance exposure by recent implementation of Biotech Yield Endorsement (BYE) 
in corn.  This crop insurance product lowers premiums and recognizes growers who 
plant certain biotech seeds. 
5 Carriquiry et al. (2005) stated in the paper that “analysis abstracts somewhat from 
reality and is conducted on detrended yield data” (p. 53). 
6 The ratio was calculated using premiums reported here. 
7 Sherrick, et al. (2004) find no evidence of a unit root in the yields. 
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8 RMA uses the same NASS data (but somewhat longer time periods) for crop 
insurance rating, but does not disclose details on any use of detrending procedures.  
9 To estimate the scaler, the following steps were performed.  First, a sample of farms 
(1056 producers) with 15 years of continuous farm-level yields was selected from 
FBFM (15 years provided an optimal balance between the length of the sample and 
number of observations). Farm yields for each county were detrended using a linear 
trend. Second, the county-level yields (from NASS) for the same time periods were 
selected and detrended using a linear time trend. The farm-level and county-level 
standard deviations were calculated from the detrended samples. The standard 
deviations for individual farms (from FBFM sample) were divided by respective 
county standard deviations (from NASS).  Third, simple averages of resulting ratios 
for each county were calculated, and the simple average for Illinois was estimated 
(individual county ratios were available for approximately 80 counties). An overall 
average is used (following iFARM calculator algorithm) with sensitivity tests 
performed around that value to illustrate the sensitivity of the results to that estimate 
of relative farm variability. For Illinois, the multiplier was equal to 1.245, suggesting 
that farm yields are on average 1.245 times more variable than county yields (the 
same value is used in iFARM).   
10 The choice of distribution is based on Sherrick et al. (2004) who suggested several 
useful properties of the Weibull distribution for modeling crop yields including its 
flexible non-symmetry, zero limit, and wide range of skewness and kurtosis. 
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11 @Risk is an “add-in” to Microsoft Excel; it has capabilities to model simulations 
in Excel using Monte Carlo and Latin Hypercube sampling methods for any 
specified parametric/non-parametric distribution.  
12 Carriquiry et al. (2005) and others used the same number of iterations. 
13 These six counties represent conditions in the north, center, and the south parts of 
the state. The state averages were derived by weighting county data by percentage of 
acres planted in the county in relation to the state   
14 RMA publishes technical coefficients by county, but does not make public any 
other ratings information. This allows rate quoting, but does not allow the 
identification of how the technical coefficients would be affected by different 
histories, nor provides a direct analytic method for relating items such as “bias” to a 
pricing effect. 
15 A maximum level of coverage (0.85) was chosen to illustrate the differences, the 
premiums across coverage levels increase almost linearly. 
 33 
 
Figures and Tables  
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210
Mean (bu/acre)
4 Year APH
10 year APH
True St.Dev
True Mean
 10 year APH Mean =164 bu/acre 4 year APH Mean =167 bu/acre
St.Dev 10 Year APH = 24 
bu/acre
St.Dev 4 Year APH = 22 
bu/acre
 
 
Figure 1.1. Simulated 4 and 10 year APH yields (Christian County, IL, corn yield 
distribution for 2006, true (expected) mean of 174 bu and standard deviation of 24 bu, 5,000 
iterations) 
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Figure 1.2. Steps in empirical model  
Step 1: NASS 
county yields 
detrended using 
linear trend. 
Standard deviation 
and mean are 
calculated for each 
county
Step 2: Scaler (ratio 
of farm level 
variability to county 
level variability) is 
calculated using 
FBFM yields and 
standard deviations 
from Step 1 are 
multiplied by the 
scaler. 
Step 3: Weibull 
distribution is fitted 
using means from 
step 1 and standard 
deviations from step 
2 and method of 
moments is used to 
estimate 
representative “ true” 
farm- level yield 
distribution     
Step 4: Trend is 
reapplied to the 
representative yield 
distributions. True 
probabilities are 
calculated by using 
mean of 
representative 
yield distribution 
times coverage 
level. 
Step 5: APH implied 
probabilities are 
calculated by 
simulating yields and 
calculating 4- 10 years 
APHmean times 
coverage level. 
Step 7: RMA ’ s
premiums are 
calculated by 
feeding true and 
APH means through 
RMA ’ s premium 
structure. Contract 
price of $4.50/bu is 
assumed. 
Step 6: Actuarial 
costs are calculated 
by simulating yields 
and using APH and 
true means as 
strikes.  Contract 
price of $4.50/bu is 
assumed. 
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Figure 1.3. Representative case farm and APH based corn yield distributions for 2006 
(Adams County, corn)   
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APH yield 168 bu/ac
coverage level 85 %
indemnity price 4.50$       /bu
basic/optional 0.9 (.9 = basic, 1 = optional)
1. Calculate guarantee per acre
aph yield x coverage level
168 0.85 142.8
2.  Calculate premium guarantee
premium guarantee x acres = 
142.8 100 14280
3.  Calculate premium liability
premium guarantee x price election x share
14280 4.5 1 64260
4. Calculate current year's yield ratio (rounded to 2 decimal places)
approved APH yield / Reference yield
168 125 1.34
5. Calculate the current year's continuous rate
1.  Current year yield ratio** current year exponent
1.34 -1.926 0.5691099
2. 1's answer x current year reference rate + fixed rate load
0.5691099 0.038 0.023 0.0446262
9. Determine the preliminary base rate
lower of 5, 6, or 8 0.0446262
10.  Adjusted base rate
preliminary base rate x adjustments
0.0446262 1 0.0446262
11. Calculate the base premium rate
adjusted base rate x coverage level
0.0446262 1.703 1.22 0.092718
12.  Calculate the total premium
premium liability x base rate x unit factor x optional coverage factor
64260 0.092718 0.9 1 5362
13. Calculate subsidy
total premium x subsidy factor
5362 0.38 2038
14. Calculate producer premium
total premium - subsidy
5362 2038 3324
premium per acre 33.24
 
 
Figure 1.4. Illustration of premium calculation using RMA’s pricing algorithm (RMA’s 
black box) for a hypothetical corn farm in Adams County, Illinois 
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Table 1.7.  True and APH implied probabilities for different scaler values for  
          APH period of 10 years and 0.85 coverage level 
      Scaler       
  1 1.15 1.2 1.245 1.3 1.35 
Christian 52% 57% 59% 66% 62% 63% 
Jefferson 66% 71% 72% 73% 74% 75% 
La Salle 54% 60% 62% 63% 64% 66% 
Lee 47% 53% 55% 56% 58% 59% 
Macon 56% 61% 63% 64% 66% 67% 
Ogle 49% 54% 56% 58% 59% 61% 
Statea 56% 61% 63% 64% 65% 67% 
            aState averages were derived by weighting county data by percentage of acres planted in the county state. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Crop Insurance Usage in Lake Woebegone 
 
Abstract  
This paper assesses the extent of expression of a “Better Than Average” 
(BTA) effect and the relationship between stated beliefs and implied 
economic decisions by examining yield expectations elicited under two 
different conceptual constructs from a sample of soybean producers. Using 
simple risk measures and constructed proxies for the BTA effect, we 
examined these effects in crop insurance demand models.  The results 
indicate the presence of the BTA effect; however, the demand model results 
suggest that these biases are not likely to strongly influence the demand for 
the insurance.  
   
U.S. farmers have demonstrated a reluctance to purchase crop insurance unless 
substantial premium subsidies are provided.  Some researchers have argued that the 
relationship between insurance and other risk management tools could explain the 
need to offer subsidies to induce participation (Mahul and Wright, 2003); others have 
cited the presence of large ad-hoc disaster payments and other forms of implicit 
insurance against low incomes offered by government programs as explanation for 
low participation (Van Asseldonk, Miranda, and Ruud 2002).  However, the 
relationship between subjective perceptions and decision to buy crop insurance has 
not been extensively studied (Sherrick 2002; Egelkraut, Sherrick, Garcia, and 
Pennings 2006a).  A careful analysis of the farmers’ subjective perceptions is very 
important for several reasons.  Crop insurance is largely rated using county-level 
yield data and minimal individual experiences.  If a farmer does not possess well-
calibrated beliefs, he might perceive such crop insurance as mispriced.  Such biased 
perceptions may influence farmers’ participation decisions and could explain some 
farmers’ reluctance to participate in crop insurance program.  The paper investigates 
whether yield risk perceptions influence farmers’ participation in crop insurance 
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program on an individual producer level.  The study examines alternate measures of 
risk and tests for impacts of these perceptions on crop insurance decisions, in the 
presence of risk management alternatives.   
          Researchers in psychology have identified a number of misperceptions 
(departures from reality) and heuristics (simplifications of reality) that individuals 
tend to display in complex or uncertain decision-making situations.  One recently 
formalized misperception is known as the “better than average” (BTA) effect.  The 
BTA effect refers to an individual’s propensity to “judge themselves as better than 
others with regard to skills or positive personality attributes.” The BTA effect occurs 
particularly in situations where the individual believes his actions directly affect 
outcomes (Glaser and Weber, 2003).  Another bias is miscalibration which defined 
as “an individual’s tendency to overestimate the precision of personal information” 
(Biais, Hilton, Pouget and Mazurier, 2003).  Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips 
(1982) provide a detailed overview of miscalibration and cite numerous examples 
across professions.  For example, they indicate that one of the few well-calibrated 
professions seemed to be meteorology, although information that is available is 
sometimes altered in presentation to mitigate asymmetric penalties for better or 
worse than forecasted weather.  Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips argue that two 
reasons could explain good calibration displayed by meteorologists: 1) repetitive 
judgments and 2) regular, fast, and clear feedback.    
           The environment in which a farmer operates and makes decisions is likely to 
promote both miscalibration and a BTA effect.  For example, the actual yield 
(feedback) is likely to be distant in time and influenced by weather and other 
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variables, thus not being clear or fast. Also, it is not unusual for a farmer to think that 
his farming skills can influence yields.  Such attitudes are likely to promote the BTA 
effect.  Despite growing evidence in the behavioral finance literature about the role 
and the influence these misperceptions play in decision-making, few studies in the 
agricultural economics literature analyze interactions between the crop insurance 
participation and the misperceptions.  One study by Egelkraut, Sherrick, Garcia, and 
Pennings (2006b), found a negative relationship between the BTA effect and 
likelihood of crop insurance purchase.  Also, Eales, Engle, Hauser, and Thompson 
(1991) found that farmers tend to underestimate the volatility of the futures and 
options prices, and Sherrick (2002) showed that farmers maintained systematically 
miscalibrated beliefs concerning precipitation.  However, none of these papers 
considered the relationship between the participation decision and misperceptions in 
the presence of other risk management tools, a situation that a farmer faces.   
           The specific objective of the paper is to provide an assessment of the extent of 
the BTA effect and miscalibration for the sample of soybean producers in Indiana, 
Illinois, and Iowa, and to evaluate the effect of risk perceptions and other risk 
management options on insurance purchasing decisions.  The participants of the 
study are commercial-scale farms, who are also likely to be intimately informed 
about crop insurance.  The analysis is conducted using data from the Crop Yield Risk 
Survey (CYRS), conducted in 2002 covering corn and soybean producers in Iowa, 
Illinois, and Indiana.  
Along with demographic, business, and other information, the survey elicited 
two separate measures of subjective yields.  Yield perceptions were elicited directly 
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(by asking farmers to indicate their average yield and yield variability in relation to 
the average county yield) and indirectly (by asking farmers to attach probabilities to 
a sequence of yield intervals).  The survey also elicited a likelihood of getting a crop 
insurance payment and had extensive documentation of actual crop insurance 
purchases and preferences for other risk management tools.  In the analysis, the 
elicited subjective yield measures were related to the county yields (estimated using 
NASS county-level data).  A regression analysis was conducted to examine the effect 
of risk perceptions on insurance purchasing decisions on the individual product level 
(yield insurance, revenue insurance, and CAT) and across insurance products.   
         The paper’s contributions are as follows.  First, the study complements a 
growing body of literature that analyzes interactions between risk perceptions and 
financial decision making (in the context of crop insurance).  Second, the study’s 
results help in understanding the role of subjective perceptions in farmer insurance 
decisions, which in turn will help design better crop insurance products, more 
efficient crop insurance program, and highlight the need for an accurate 
understanding of actual risks faced. 
Background and Literature Review  
The farm characteristics that might affect demand for crop insurance have been 
examined extensively in the literature.  For example, Smith and Baquet (1996) have 
examined factors that influence demand for crop insurance using farm-level dataset 
from a sample of wheat producers in Montana.  They modeled participation decision 
as two-step process; in the first step a farmer decides whether to purchase insurance 
and (assuming the farmer has decided to purchase crop insurance) in the second step 
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a farmer chooses a coverage level.  The results indicated that education, presence of 
debt, perceived importance of yield variability, increased the probability of 
participation and coverage level, and premium rates.  Coble, Knight, Pope, and 
Williams (1996) analyzed participation decisions of Kansas wheat farmers, where 
they used participation decision as the dependent variable and farm-level data to 
identify the variables that contributed to the probability of purchase.  Results 
indicated that returns from crop insurance increase the probability of purchase and 
the variance of the return decreases likelihood of use of crop insurance.  The market 
returns from operations decreased purchase probability while the variance of market 
returns increased it.  Both net worth and diversification were likely to decrease the 
probability of purchase.  Sherrick, Barry, Ellinger, and Schnitkey (2004b) used 
survey data, and modeled farmers’ participation decisions as a two-step choice.  In 
the first stage a farmer decides whether to insure or not, and in the second the 
farmers makes a choice between yield insurance, revenue insurance, and or hail 
insurance. The results indicated that size, age, leverage, greater share of leased land, 
higher level of perceived risk, higher subjective yields, and a greater perceived 
importance of risk management tools were likely to contribute to the probability of 
insurance purchase.  Overall, the econometric results of the demand for crop 
insurance studies indicate that size is likely to increase participation, diversification 
is likely to decrease participation, and higher yield/income variability is likely to 
increase participation as well. 
          The role of farmers’ perceptions in the crop insurance decision has limited 
presence in the literature.  Sherrick et al.(2004b) using survey data analyzed demand 
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for crop insurance products found a significant and positive relationship between 
decision to participate and subjective mean, indicating that producers with higher 
mean yields are more likely to purchase insurance.  They also document the roles of 
education, size, tenure, and subjective means (estimated from indirectly elicited 
subjective yield distributions) as a proxy for differences in soil quality or 
management skills.  However, Sherrick et al. (2004b) did not consider the impact of 
miscalibration and the BTA effect.  Shaik, Coble, and Knight (2005) elicited 
subjective estimates of mean and variability for yield and price and also proxies for 
risk aversion.  Unlike Sherrick, Barry, Ellinger, and Schnitkey (2004b), they found a 
negative and significant relationship between the subjective mean yield and the 
participation decision, and a positive relationship between the participation and 
subjective yield variability.  For revenue insurance, the results indicated a negative 
and significant relationship for subjective mean and a positive significant 
relationship for the subjective yield variability.  Shaik, Coble and Knight (2005) did 
not consider the impact of the BTA effect on the crop insurance.  Egelkraut et al. 
(2006) investigated the influence of subjective perceptions on the producers’ crop 
insurance decision using a dataset from a similar survey with responses from 258 
Illinois corn producers.   They elicited subjective yield perceptions using the 
conviction weights approach (indirectly), and directly, by asking respondents open-
ended questions about farms’ yield level and variability in relation to an average 
county farm.  They used directly elicited yield perceptions as independent variables 
in the regression analysis to explain the demand for crop insurance.  The results from 
the regression analysis indicated that farmers’ perceptions affected crop insurance, as 
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coefficients for the direct estimates for the mean yield and variability were 
significant with expected signs. Egelkraut et al. (2006) did not consider the impact of 
miscalibration on the participation decisions.  Also, they did not consider the 
influence of the BTA effect on the participation decisions in the presence of risk 
management alternatives. 
          This paper continues investigating the role of cognitive biases on crop 
insurance decisions by including information on alternative risk management tools 
usage and miscalibration, in addition to the variables that were used in the previous 
research.  The inclusion of information on alternative risk management tools in the 
analysis is relevant because when a farmer makes a decision regarding participation 
she considers alternatives as well, so these alternatives should be included.  Similarly, 
as indicated by some of the findings, miscalibration and the BTA effect might 
influence decision making.  By adding these variables into the analysis, this paper 
further contributes to the growing body of research and improves our understanding 
of the producers’ perceptions and the role these perceptions play in decision making.     
Survey  
The study uses data from the crop yield risk survey (CYRS) conducted at the 
University of Illinois under a cooperative agreement with the Economic Research 
Service USDA and supported by the Risk Management Agency of USDA.     
          The mailing list used in the survey consisted of 3,000 farms from Illinois, 
Indiana, and Iowa, purchased from “Progressive Farmer”, a company specializing in 
communication with agricultural producers.  Because the sample selected for the 
survey was meant to be representative of large-scale, commercial farms, farms with 
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at least 100 acres or greater were selected.  During the survey-formulation stage, two 
focus groups with farmers were held by an independent market research firm; the 
survey was reviewed by University of Illinois staff and economist from ERS USDA; 
it also was pretested with a set of farmers who participate in the FBFM record 
keeping association; and it was evaluated and tested by the Survey Design Research 
Lab at the University of Illinois.  The survey was mailed on March 2001 with a cover 
letter, that stated the purpose, confidentiality, completion instructions, contact 
information for any questions, and an honor payment for $3.00 to be cashed 
conditional upon successful completion and mailing of the survey.  The survey 
included sections on demographic and business information, risk management; risk 
perceptions, the conjoint ranking of insurance products and attributes, and other 
related information (see Barry, Ellinger, Schnitkey, Sherrick, and Wansink 2002 for 
more details about the survey and overall projects).    
Indirect Yield Elicitation  
The survey elicited subjective yields under two conceptually very different 
constructs.  Indirectly, the survey asked individuals to assign probabilities into 
predefined yield categories (for an example see figure 2.1).  The sum of the intervals 
was stated as 100%, requiring respondents’ stated probabilities to add up to 100%.  
This probabilistic approach, known as the conviction weights approach (Norris and 
Cramer 1994), was employed by Bessler (1980) and Eales et al. (1990) as a means of 
eliciting probabilistic beliefs by producers.       
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Direct Yield Elicitation  
Yields also were elicited directly by asking respondents to indicate whether their 
average farm yields are greater/smaller/same as their county average and whether 
their farm yields experience greater/smaller/same degree of variability.16  If a farmer 
indicated that his yield is smaller/greater than the county average, the survey asked 
farmers to state the difference (in bushels) between county average and farm average.         
Methods  
Indirectly Elicited Subjective Yields  
The survey elicited a subjective yield distribution by asking respondents to assign 
probabilities to the yield intervals.  These discrete probabilities were used to 
parameterize subjective yield distributions by fitting a distribution using equation 
(1):    
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Where pij - producer i stated probability for interval j  
           Uij – upper bound of the interval 
           D(.) – cumulative distribution of farm-level yields  
           
i
θ  - set of i two dimensional parameters for producer i’s subjective yield     
                  distribution    
The Weibull distribution as parametric form was chosen because Sherrick et al.  
(2004a) suggested several of its useful properties for modeling crop yields including 
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its non-symmetry, zero limit, and wide range of skewness and kurtosis.  The CDF of 
the Weibull has the following functional form: 
( ) 1  0 x< , , 0
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i i
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β α β         (2) 
Objective Yields  
The respondent’s typical objective yield was set equal to average county yield (and 
also to state differences where relevant). Because the average is subject to historic 
yield data which had a strong upward trend, to calculate the average and standard 
deviation, the soybean county yields were obtained from NASS for the years 1972-
2002 and detrended to the 2002 using a linear trend at a county level (following 
Sherrick et al.(2004a)).   
Correspondence between Subjective Yield Perceptions and Objective Yield 
Distribution  
To assess the correspondence between subjective and objective yield distributions, 
this paper compares directly-stated yields, indirectly-stated yields, and county yields.  
T-test and Wilcox tests were conducted to examine if objective yields were 
statistically different from indirectly-elicited subjective yields.  If a farmer’s stated 
yield differs from the objective yield, a BTA effect could be a possible explanation.  
Demand for Crop Insurance  
The relationship between crop insurance and misperceptions is examined in two 
related steps, at individual product level, across the products.  The demand for each 
insurance product (yield, revenue, and CAT insurance) is analyzed separately using a 
logit model to assess the influence of miscalibration and the BTA effect.  The 
rationale behind conducting analysis on the individual basis is to examine whether 
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the BTA effect and miscalibration influence various insurance products differently, 
(i.e., misperceptions affect demand for yield insurance differently than they affect 
the demand for revenue insurance). For the analysis across insurance products, the 
product choices are aggregated (effectively representing the crop insurance usage 
index), and the Poisson regression used to examine the relationship between key 
variables and the index that represents an individual overall propensity to use crop 
insurance products17.   
Individual products.  The relationship between biases and crop insurance for 
individual products are examined separately for each crop insurance product.  For 
using the specifications given below yield insurance, equation (3) is estimated, for 
revenue insurance, equation (4) is estimated, and for CAT insurance equation (5) is 
estimated.  The variables for the equations were obtained from the past studies and 
will be shown in the parentheses.  Since crop insurance participation decisions are 
discrete, a binomial logit model was employed to analyze the relationship:     
0 1 2 3 4 4 5 6YI AGE LOAN MBTA VBTA MRATIO VRATIO SIZEβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + +
7 8 9 10 11 12 13LSTOC APROB FRMS MRMS PRMS OTT EDUβ β β β β β β+ + + + + + + +
14 15 16IL IA INβ β β ε+ + + + ,                                                                                            
where YI denotes choice for yield insurance (binary, equals 1 if a farmer bought yield 
insurance, and zero otherwise), AGE denotes producer’s age (Sherrick et al. 2004b), 
LOAN is a binary variable (equals 0 if farmer has no debt, 1 otherwise) (Sherrick et 
al. 2004b, various proxies used by Barnett, Skees, and Hourigan, 1990)  MBTA is 
mean BTA effect (discrete choice variable, equals 1 if a farmer claims his yields are 
above or equal to county average, 0 if he claims they are below), VTBA is variance 
BTA effect (discrete choice variable, equals 1 if a farmer claims his yields are less 
(3) 
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variable or as variable as county average yield, 0 if he claims they are more variable), 
MRATIO denotes mean miscalibration (difference between indirectly-stated 
subjective mean and corresponding objective mean), VRATIO denotes variance 
miscalibration (ratio of indirectly-stated subjective standard deviation divided by 
objective standard deviation), SIZE is variable for farm size (in acres) (used by 
Sherrick et al. 2004b, Coble et al. 1996, and Barnett, Skees, and Hourigan, 1990 
among others), LSTOC is the diversification variable for livestock sales as 
percentage of gross farm sales (used by Sherrick et al. 2004, and Skees, and 
Hourigan, 1990, among the others), APROB denotes farmers’ probability of 
receiving indemnity payments under 85% APH coverage level (used Sherrick et al. 
2004b), FRMS is a discrete count variable, which denotes a combination of financial 
risk management tools such as credit line, savings, government disaster payments 
used by farmers to manage the risks, and etc (various proxies for disaster payments 
were used by Smith and Baquet, 1996 among others), MRMS is a discrete count 
variable, which denotes a combination of marketing risk management tools such as 
forward contracting, usage of futures and options, etc. used by farmers to manage the 
risks, PRMS is discrete count denotes combination of production risk management 
tools such as farming in multiple locations, usage of multicrop enterprises, etc. used 
by farmers to manage the risks (Sherrick et al. (2004b) used FRMS, MRMS, and 
PRMS as a combined index denoting farmer’s usage of risk management instruments 
in the past), OTT is ratio of owned acres to total acres (various proxies for tenure 
were used by Goodwin (1994) and Sherrick et al. (2004b)), EDU is a discrete count 
variable, denotes farmers’ education level  (equals 1 if farmer completed high school, 
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2 completed some college, 3 college graduate, and 4 if farmer has graduate degree) 
(used by Sherrick et al.(2004b)), Smith and Baquet (1996), and IL, IA, and IN denote 
binary variables for location (equals 1 if farm is located in corresponding state and 0 
otherwise).  
 To examine the relationship between revenue insurance and the biases 
equation (4) is estimated as: 
0 1 2 3 4 4 5 6RI AGE LOAN MBTA VBTA MRATIO VRATIO SIZEβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + +  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13LSTOC APROB FRMS MRMS PRMS OTT EDUβ β β β β β β+ + + + + + + +
14 15 16IL IA INβ β β ε+ + + + ,                                                                                          (4) 
where RI denotes choice for revenue insurance (binary, equals 1 if a farmer bought 
revenue insurance, and zero otherwise).   
 Similarly, the relationship between CAT insurance and the biases is 
examined by estimating equation (5)  
0 1 2 3 4 4 5 6CAT AGE LOAN MBTA VBTA MDIFF VDIFF SIZEβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + +  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13LSTOC APROB FRMS MRMS PRMS OTT EDUβ β β β β β β+ + + + + + + +
14 15 16IL IA INβ β β ε+ + + + ,                                                                                         (5) 
where the CAT denotes choice for catastrophic insurance (binary, equals 1 if a 
farmer bought catastrophic insurance, and zero otherwise).  Equations (3), (4), and 
(5) are each estimated using binomial logit.  
Aggregate Use. Finally to analyze aggregate use of crop insurance, the variable user 
was created, which is the sum of all crop insurance products that a farmer used, and 
equation (6) was estimated     
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0 1 2 3 4 4 5 6USER AGE LOAN MBTA VBTA MRATIO VRATIO SIZEβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + + +
7 8 9 10 11 12 13LSTOC APROB FRMS MRMS PRMS OTT EDUβ β β β β β β+ + + + + + + +
14 15 16IL IA INβ β β ε+ + + + ,                                                                                         (6) 
where USER is the sum of all crop insurance products used by a farmer (count 
variable, 0 if a farmer used no crop insurance product, 3 if a farmer used all 
insurance products).  Since “user” is a count variable, Poisson regression model was 
used to estimate the relationship (Greene, 2004).   
Expected Relationships  
In this section, the expected relationship between insurance, the BTA effect, 
miscalibration, and the control variables are presented and discussed.  These 
variables are grouped into categories corresponding to BTA characteristics, 
miscalibration, personal characteristics, risk management characteristics, and farm-
level characteristics.   
BTA Characteristics:  It is expected that an overconfident farmer would view 
premiums as being relatively expensive and, therefore, would be less likely to 
purchase insurance.     
Miscalibration Characteristics:  The mean ratio (between implied mean of the 
subjective Weibull distribution and implied mean of the objective Weibull 
distributions) and standard deviation ratio (between implied standard deviation of the 
subjective Weibull distribution and implied standard deviation of the objective 
Weibull distribution) were included to allow the model to capture the incongruence 
between subjective beliefs and empirical representations of the yields.  The expected 
relationship between the mean ratio and participation is negative -- if producer’s 
subjective mean is smaller than the objective mean, he might think that there is a 
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good chance to receive an indemnity.18 Thus, such producer is thought to be more 
likely to purchase crop insurance.  Similarly, if a producer’s subjective yield 
variability is greater than objective variability, then, he is more likely to participate 
in insurance than a producer with lower subjective yield risk.  Therefore, the 
expected sign between standard deviation ratio and the participation is positive.        
Personal Characteristics: Among the demographic characteristics included are age 
and education.  The expected relationship between insurance use and education is 
positive; risk management has become significantly more complicated through time.  
Furthermore, this paper postulates a positive relationship between insurance use and 
age.  As a farmer gets older, he is more likely to be risk averse and thus is more 
likely to purchase insurance.          
Risk Management Variables:  Because farmers have other risk management tools 
available that might act as complements or substitutes for insurance, the survey 
asked subjects to indicate what risk management tools they have used in the past.  
The survey listed several risk management alternatives and asked whether a 
respondent used a particular risk management alternative.   The alternatives were 
grouped in three categories corresponding to: i) financial risk management tools 
(such as government programs, financial savings/reserves, back-up credit lines); ii) 
marketing risk management score (such as hedging/options, spreading sales over 
time, production/marketing contracts, forward contracting); iii) and production risk 
management score (such as multiple crop enterprises, crop share leases, multiple 
seed varieties, farming in multiple locations).  Thus, if a respondent used forward 
contracting, credit lines and savings, his financial risk management score would be 
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equal to 2 (credit lines and savings), marketing risk management score would be 
equal to 1 (forward contracting) and production risk management score would be 
equal to 0.  All farmers in the samples used at least one of the risk management 
alternatives.        
Farm-level Variables: Additional variables such as farm size, diversification, debt, 
and wealth, were included in the analysis.  Large farms tend to be better managed; 
therefore, size is indicative of better management skills and possibly, economies of 
scale.  Large farms are likely to be more diversified.  Both of factors are expected to 
reduce demand for crop insurance.   
         Debt and insurance use might be positively correlated, as lenders often require 
farmers to purchase insurance.  Wealthier farmers tend to self-insure, therefore, 
percentage of owned acres to total acres (a proxy for wealth) is likely to be 
negatively related to insurance use.  Livestock ownership is another method for a 
farmer to diversify, therefore, livestock sales as a percentage of gross farm income is 
likely to be negatively related to insurance.  Finally, to measure the level of insurable 
risk, the perceived probability of receiving an APH yield insurance payment was 
included following Sherrick et al. (2004b).  A positive relationship is expected, 
because higher risk levels will increase the probability of insurance purchase. 
Survey Data  
The survey was mailed to 3000 farmers, 930 farmers responded, resulting in 
approximately 29% survey response rate.  After removing incomplete and/or 
inconsistent responses, the final sample consisted of 382 farmers.19 Because soybean 
distribution intervals in the survey’s subjective distribution section provided better 
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range for actual yield than the corn distribution intervals, the soybean subjective 
distributions were used in the analysis (note that the majority of soybean producers 
also likely to grow corn).  Table 2.1 reports average farm values by insurance 
products.  Among insurance products, revenue insurance was used by the largest 
farms (in acres, as suggested by size), youngest, and most leveraged users with fewer 
years of experience.  The revenue insurance users also utilize fewer financial risk 
management tools, have the lowest tenure, and report the lowest subjective 
probability of receiving an indemnity payment under 85% APH.  CAT insurance is 
the least popular insurance product, with the oldest, most experienced and tenured 
users, who have the smallest farms and report the lowest probability of receiving 
indemnity under 55% coverage level.   
          As with any survey, it is possible that selection bias could affect the results.  If 
for some reason, large farmers self selected this survey, the reported farmers’ 
tendency to indicate above average yields could be the consequence of having a 
sample of larger than average farms, rather than the BTA effect.  Therefore, if one 
could compare the survey sample characteristics to the actual farm data, any 
discrepancies could be indicative of the sample selection bias.  This hypothesis is 
examined in table 2.2, which compares actual farmer data from producers enrolled in 
the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) record-keeping system to data 
from the survey (since FBFM covers only Illinois farmers, the Illinois subset was 
used).  FBFM maintains detailed records of its members, very large, commercial-
scale farms in Illinois, the type of farms that were original target of the survey.  
Results from the table suggest that in terms of age, the farms in the sample and the 
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FBFM are distributed similarly.  However, in terms of size, FBFM farms are larger 
across all categories.  Because FBFM farms are larger across all categories, one can 
conclude that the survey might not be subject to the size selection bias, assuming that 
the sample selection bias could be manifested as size or age differences between the 
sample and population.   
Results    
Yield Elicitation Results: Continuous parametric forms of subjective yield 
distribution were derived by minimizing (1), and solving for the parameters of the 
Weibull distribution.  These parameters were used to estimate indirectly-stated mean 
and standard deviation using (7) and (8) as:  
1(1 )i i iµ β α
−= Γ +
          (7) 
1 2 1(1 2 ) (1 )i i i iσ β α α
− − = Γ + −Γ +         (8) 
         The mean for a county yield was calculated from detrended NASS county 
yields and the standard deviation for a typical farm was derived as county-level 
standard deviation.   
         Table 2.3 summarizes the respondents’ direct statements of their own mean 
yield and yield risk relative to county’s average yield.  The majority of respondents 
(53% in Iowa, 57% in Indiana, 61% in Illinois), indicated that their yields are higher 
than average (on average by 8.9 bu/ac in Iowa, 8.8 bu/ac in Indiana, and 8.4 bu/ac in 
Illinois).  Thirty eight percent of respondents in Iowa, 41% in Indiana, and 31% in 
Illinois indicated that their yields are about the same as average yield, and 9% of 
respondents in Iowa, 2% in Indiana, and 9% in Illinois indicated that their yields are 
below average.  Table 2.4 reports producers’ subjective assessment of their yield risk.  
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Forty one percent of respondents in Iowa, 48% in Indiana, and 47% in Illinois 
perceived their yields to be less variable than the county yields, and 20% of 
respondents in Iowa, 15% in Indiana, and 10% in Illinois reported their yields to be 
more variable than the yields of a typical county. Combining results from the two 
tables, 80% respondents in the sample indicated that their yields are better and/or 
their yields are less variable or are of the same degree of variability than the county 
yields.  These results are consistent with the “Lake Woebegone Effect” where all 
managers believe themselves to be “above average”.   
          Comparison of response weighted indirectly-stated yields and county average 
yields reveal well-calibrated subjective beliefs.  The average, indirectly-stated yield 
for Iowa was 45.40 bu/ac (44.97 bu/ac for Indiana, 46.03 bu/ac for Illinois, and 45.56 
bu/ac for total sample), and the subjective mean was not statistically different from 
county average yield of 45.19 bu/ac for Iowa, (45.45 bu/ac for Indiana, 45.46 bu/ac 
for Illinois, and 45.32 bu/ac for total sample) at p>0.00120.  The differences in 
directly-stated, county average, and indirectly-stated yields are consistent with the 
results from previous literature.  For example, Egelkraut et al. (2006a) reported that 
directly-stated yields were above county average and indirectly-stated yields.  They 
further argued that “the results reveal a fundamental contrast between producer’s 
beliefs when asked for a simple statement of average yield as opposed to assessing a 
complete probabilities version of their yield distribution”.      
          Overall, the presented comparison raises a question. Why the same farmers 
who reported reasonably calibrated yield distributions in one survey section, would 
reveal distorted beliefs concerning yields in another? As argued in the third paper, 
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one possible explanation could be elicitation formats.  Recent findings in contingent 
valuation literature showed that donation amounts elicited using direct elicitation 
method are almost always lower than actual donation amounts and the amounts 
elicited through continuous type of questions (Champ and Bishop, 2001).  The 
proposed explanation in the literature is that direct elicitation results in an upward 
bias as some respondents tend to be less sure about their answers.  We argue that this 
“unsureness” could be the function of complexity of the elicitation format.  
Answering direct elicitation does not require significant efforts and as a result such 
format might lead to the answers that respondents are not sure about or the answers 
that have not been evaluated carefully.  As task complexity of elicitation format 
increases from direct elicitation to probabilistic assessment, respondents are forced to 
carefully evaluate their responses and to provide more accurate yield assessments.  
Also, while some farmers displayed the BTA effect, a particular farmer would make 
careful assessment of yields before purchasing insurance.  So the effect, while 
present, might not be significant in determining insurance decisions.  The next 
section examines this question in greater detail.   
Crop Insurance Use  
In this section the results from the regressions are presented and discussed.  While 
coefficients for logit and the Poisson regression models are helpful in providing 
direction and significance, to facilitate the discussion, the marginal fixed effects are 
also reported for each model.  These effects refer to df () dxt  evaluated at x, where 
f( ) is an endogenous variable, x is a vector of exogenous variables used to explain 
f( ), and xt is one of the exogenous variables.  The effects can be used to describe the 
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change in probability due to a change in independent variable of interest (holding 
other exogenous variables at their averages).  
          Table 2.5 shows correlations for the variables used in the analysis.  The results 
indicate that insurance products are positively correlated with each other and the 
correlation is statistically significant.  Variable for age (AGE) is positively correlated 
with CAT insurance, and debt (LOAN) is positively correlated with revenue 
insurance.  Risk management strategies (FRMS), (MRMS), (PRMS), are positively 
correlated with insurance products.  However, none of the variables for the 
subjective perceptions (MBTA), (MRATIO), (VBTA), and (VRATIO) are correlated 
with insurance products.  Interestingly, BTA and miscalibration proxies are 
correlated, mean BTA (MBTA) effect is positively and significantly correlated with 
mean miscalibration (MRATIO) and variance BTA effect (VBTA). Similarly, 
variance miscalibration (VRATIO) is negatively correlated with mean miscalibration 
(MRATIO) and positively correlated with variance BTA effect (VBTA).  Also, mean 
BTA (MBTA) is correlated with usage of marketing risk management tools (MRMS).     
          The econometric results are reported in table 2.6.  The table reports 
coefficients, signs, marginal effects, and significance by product.  It also reports 
pseudo R square, the likelihood ratio, and the percentage of correctly predicted 
observations.  For the yield insurance model (model 1), the results in the table 
indicate that age (AGE), size (SIZE), livestock sales as a percentage of total revenue 
(LSTOCK), probability of receiving an indemnity (APROP), financial risk 
management score (FRMS), market risk management score (MRMS), and production 
risk management score (PRMS) contribute to the yield insurance use.  Older farmers, 
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riskier farms, smaller farms, farms with larger percentage of livestock sales, and 
farmers who are more likely to try other risk management tools, are also more likely 
to purchase yield insurance.  None of the proxies for the behavioral biases were 
significant.   
          For the revenue insurance model (model 2), results show that age (AGE), debt 
(LOAN), size (SIZE), livestock sales as a percentage of total revenue (LSTOCK),  
probability of receiving indemnity (APROB), and production risk management 
(PRMS) score contribute to revenue insurance usage.  Thus, younger farmers with 
smaller farms, more leveraged farmers, riskier farms, and farmers who are more 
likely to try production risk management tools are more likely to purchase revenue 
insurance.  As with yield insurance, none of the proxies for the biases were 
significant. 
          For the CAT insurance model (model 3), the results show that age (AGE), 
leverage (LOAN), size (SIZE), livestock sales as a percentage of total revenue 
(LSTOCK), probability of receiving indemnity (APROB), and the market risk 
management score (MRMS) are likely to contribute to CAT insurance use.  These 
results indicate that older, less risky, more leveraged users, who use market risk 
management tools, and have smaller farms are more likely to use crop insurance.  
The negative relationship between probability of receiving APH insurance payment 
and CAT purchase is especially interesting.  The CAT insurance is provided for a 
nominal fee and lender often require borrower to purchase some type of crop 
insurance. It could be that farmers who purchase CAT insurance do so to satisfy 
lending requirement and do not expect to benefit from it.  Again, as with the previous 
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models, the proxies for the biases were not significant. Note that predictive ability is 
much lower for CAT insurance.       
          Table 2.7 presents results for the Poisson regression model with dependent 
variable user (model 4).  The only significant variables are age (AGE), size (SIZE), 
livestock sales as a percentage of total revenue (LSTOCK), perceived probability of 
receiving APH payment (APROB), and risk management scores (FRMS), (MRMS), 
and (PRMS).  Older farmers with smaller, less diversified farms, higher perceived 
probabilities of receiving insurance payments and higher usage of other risk 
management tools are more likely to buy crop insurance products.   
         The pseudo R-squared is low across both individual and aggregate use models, 
but the likelihood ratios are significant.  Overall, the results suggest that age 
increases probability of yield and CAT insurance purchase, and decreases the 
probability of revenue insurance purchase, leverage increases probability of purchase 
for revenue and CAT insurance and decreases the probability for yield insurance and 
the size decreases likelihood of purchase.  Also, the results suggest that farmers with 
perceived higher probability of receiving APH payment are more likely to participate 
in yield and revenue insurance program (both at individual product and aggregate 
use level) and less likely to participate in CAT insurance.  Livestock sales as a 
percentage of total revenue increased probability of participation for yield insurance 
and decreased participation for all other types of insurance.  Also farmers who 
actively used risk management tools are more likely to use insurance products. 
          Unlike Coble et al.(1996), Smith and Baquet (1996), and Sherrick et al. 
(2004b), the results detect no relationship between participation and net worth and 
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education (Smith and Baquet, 1996).  The results indicate a relationship between 
crop insurance use and leverage (consistent with Smith and Baquet (1996), and 
Sherrick et al (2004b)), size and diversification (consistent with Coble et al.(1996)).   
          Interestingly, the variables that were consistently significant in all models are 
risk management scores. There could be two reasons explaining the significance.  
One reason is past experience with risk management tools.  If a farmer had a positive 
experience using one risk management tool, he is more likely to continue using it, 
and is more likely to use other risk management instruments as well.  The positive 
past experience with risk management tools would explain high significance, and 
provide some further empirical support to the academic literature on experience 
based crop insurance discounts (see for example Rejesus, Coble, Knight, Jin, 2006).  
Another, possibly complimentary, explanation is risk aversion.  If a farmer is a risk 
averse, he is more likely to try any and all risk management instruments.  Therefore, 
simple risk aversion would explain high significance observed in the regression 
models.   
          No significant relationship was detected between misperceptions (both the 
BTA effect and miscalibration) and crop insurance purchase.  Thus, the results 
suggest that the effect does not seem to influence crop insurance decisions.  The 
results are not consistent with Egelkraut et al.(2006b) who reported a negative 
significant relationship between insurance purchase and the BTA effect.  One 
possible explanation could be in different specifications of the model, for example, 
presence of risk aversion variables in Egelkraut et al. model (which were not 
available in this survey). 
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Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper was to assess the extent of the BTA effect and 
miscalibration and examine whether these biases influence insurance purchasing 
decisions using data from a survey that covered soybeans producers from Illinois, 
Iowa, and Indiana.  The survey elicited subjective yield perceptions using two 
different elicitation methods.  While a majority of farmers indicated that their 
average yield is greater than the county yield, and similarly, that their yields are less 
variable than the county yields, the means of the subjective yield distribution 
recovered from indirectly elicited yields, corresponded closely to the county yield 
means.  The results are consistent with Egelkraut et al. (2006b), Bessler (1980), 
Pease (1993), and Eales et al. (1990).  The results illustrated that age increases 
probability of participation for revenue and CAT insurance and decrease the 
probability for yield insurance.  Therefore, encouraging older farmers to participate 
in revenue insurance could be an effective strategy to increase participation.  
Leverage increases probability of participation for revenue and CAT insurance 
products, size decreases the probability for all insurance products.  Diversification 
(measured as sales of livestock) decreases the likelihood of purchase across all 
insurance products, and probability of receiving insurance payments increases the 
likelihood for yield and revenue insurance, and decreases it for CAT insurance.  This 
significance is consistent with the results from the first paper that showed presence 
of adverse selection.  The results also suggested that farmers who had used other risk 
management tools before are more likely to participate in crop insurance program as 
well; suggesting that RMA should consider providing discounts for a continuous use 
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of crop insurance and target farmers who actively use risk management tools.  
Accounting for trend and bringing more farmers through effective targeting (both in 
terms of risk management usage and age) could mitigate adverse selection.  Both the 
BTA effect and miscalibration do not seem to affect crop insurance purchasing 
decisions.  This finding contradicts results by Egelkraut et al. (2006b) who a found 
negative relationship between the BTA effect and insurance participation using s 
similar survey that covered only Illinois corn producers.  While results suggested 
little relationship between BTA effect and participation, further training and 
education might benefit farmers by making farmers aware of the bias. 
         The results imply that the biases discussed are likely to be present in farmers’ 
decision making.  However, these biases are not likely to substantially influence 
actual producer insurance decisions, further supporting the argument that will be 
made in the third paper that the BTA effect likely to be due to the elicitation format 
that has been shown to result in upward bias, rather than fundamental miscalibration 
of beliefs.  A related implication is farmers are rational when crop insurance 
participation is involved.  These implications provide different view from previous 
findings and suggest that the role these biases play in the decision making might not 
be as significant as some economists have argued in the past.  Of course the results 
are generalizable only to the extent our sample is representative of the farmers’ 
population and to the extent that the specifics of the crop insurance underwriting and 
purchasing process is similar to other insurance products underwriting and 
purchasing process.  For this reason, a goal of the future studies may be to test the 
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role of these biases using different insurance products, or using sample of crop 
insurance users from different geographical region, growing different crops.       
Endnotes 
 
16 An example of the question: “Relative to your primary county’s average yield, 
would you say you average yield is (check box, fill in blank) __higher, 
by___bu/acres, _lower, by __by/acres, about the same”, “Relative to the same county, 
would you say your yields are (check box) more stable, more variable, same degree 
variability” 
17 The survey asked respondents following question: “Which of the following risk 
management tools have you used in the past?” Such wording allowed some 
respondents to indicate that they have used several insurance products (for example, 
yield insurance and revenue insurance or yield insurance and CAT insurance and so 
on).  Since the choice of insurance products in this case is not mutually exclusive and 
simultaneous, Poisson regression was thought to be more relevant than the 
multinomial logit/probit models.   
18 Note that all farms in a county get same rated insurance so directional relative 
effects should be fairly sensible 
19 Surveys with less than 10% summing errors in distribution section were rescaled 
(divided by total of the reported probabilities) and used. Also, because soybean 
distribution intervals in the survey’s subjective distribution section provided a better 
range for actual yield than the intervals for the corn distribution, only soybean 
subjective distributions were used in the analysis.  As a result of this selection 
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criterion, the sample could include soybean producers who might/might not be corn 
producers.  Producers, who indicated that they farmed in several primary counties, 
were also eliminated.  Furthermore, all observations that had missing entries for the 
variables used in the analysis were eliminated as well 
20 Statistical significance was assessed using paired t-test to account for a possible 
dependence between subjective and county means.  (Bluman, 2001) 
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Figures and Tables  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Sample question for indirectly-elicited yields  
 
 
 
 
 
Corn-Yield range Probability Soybeans- Yield Range Probability 
Less than 40 bu/acre  Less than 10 bu/acre  
41 to 60 bu/acre  11 to 20 bu/acre  
61 to 80 bu/acre  21 to 30 bu/acre  
81 to 100 bu/acre  31 to 40 bu/acre  
101 to 120 bu/acre  41 to 50 bu/acre  
121 to 140 bu/acre  51 to 60 bu/acre  
141 to 160 bu/acre  61 to 70 bu/acre  
More than 160 bu/acre  More than 70 bu/acre  
Total (Should sum to 100%) 100% Total (Should sum to 100%) 100% 
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Table 2.2.  Farm characteristics for survey sample (Illinois subset, soybean) and FBFM,  
by age  
 Age Category less than 30 30 – 39 40 - 49 50 - 59 60 & over 
Farm  Distribution 3% 9% 35% 31% 22% Survey 
Data Tillable Acres (acres) 880 728 893 734 601 
Farm  Distribution 3% 9% 29% 31% 28% FBFM 
Data for 
2006 Tillable Acres (acres) 971 1034 1061 991 878 
 
 76 
Table 2.3. Producers average subjective yields relative to average county yield 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Higher About the Lower  
 Yield by… Same Yield By… Obs 
 % bu/ac % % bu/ac Count 
IA 53 8.9 38 9 6.2 190 
IN 57 8.8 41 2 3.2 55 
IL 60 8.4 31 9 5 137 
Total 56 8.7 36 8 5.6 382 
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Table 2.4. Producers subjective yield variability relative to county yield variability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Less About the Same More 
 Variable Variability Variable 
 % % % 
IA 41 39 20 
IN 48 37 15 
IL 47 43 10 
Total 44 40 16 
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Table 2.7.  Aggregate product use results 
 Model 4 (Dependent Variable: User) 
 Coefficients Marginal Effects 
IL -0.0202067 -0.0174616 
IA 0.2117762 0.1839693 
AGE 0.0088856*** 0.0077001 
LOAN 0.1515867 0.1272708 
MBTA -0.109015 -0.0989674 
SIZE -0.0001423*** -0.0001234 
LSTOCK -0.0003079*** -0.0002668 
APROB 0.0068083*** 0.0058999 
FRMS 0.1585426** 0.1373902 
MRMS 0.1931505* 0.1673807 
PRMS 0.1325118** 0.1148324 
OTT -0.0280902 -0.0243425 
EDU -0.0606925 -0.052595 
MRATIO -0.0432156 -0.0374498 
VBTA -0.0482842 -0.0425418 
VRATIO -0.0314923 -0.0272906 
IN -1.272242 - 
Pseudo R2 0.1  
Likelihood Ratioa 87.9  
Note: *,**,and *** denotes statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 level. 
a) The ratio follows Chi-square distribution with degree of freedoms equal to the number of 
 independent variables in the regression.  The null hypothesis is that the coefficients are not 
 significantly different from zero. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Farmers’ Subjective Yield Distributions and Elicitation Formats  
 
 
Abstract 
Subjective yield perceptions were elicited in two different formats from 
Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa farmers and compared to objective county-level 
yields.  The results indicate that subjective perceptions elicited in a 
probabilistic framework provide a reasonably accurate representation of 
yields, suggesting that as a group, farmers’ perceptions are well-calibrated.  
Importantly, this elicitation method is shown to be more accurate than 
direct yield elicitation.  The findings have important implications for survey 
design/use and for the analysis of subjective beliefs elicited through surveys 
involving direct elicitation. 
 
Farmers’ beliefs about probabilistic events directly influence their production and 
risk management decisions.  However, since these beliefs cannot be directly 
observed or measured through simple means, subjective estimates are often elicited 
from farmers themselves through variously designed surveys.  A natural question 
emerges as to the reliability of these estimates relative to objective or resulting 
distributions of outcomes.    While it is reasonable to expect farmers’ subjective 
perceptions to correspond to reality, the existence of such biases as overconfidence, 
and person’s reliance on certain heuristics in decision-making might distort farmers’ 
perceptions.  While this question has been examined in the past, Nerlove and Bessler 
(2001) examining current evidence of our understanding regarding how individuals 
form expectations and respond to these expectations, noted that “When asked in a 
survey what they expect with respect to such-and-such, and what and how do 
respondents answer? On the whole we remain ignorant of respondents’ state of mind, 
and really carefully designed surveys directed to elucidating these matters remain to 
be carried out.” (pg 199).  In a related question, it is important to consider 
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differences in encoding or response validity among alternative elicitation methods.  
This is especially relevant given recently observed differences in elicitation formats 
in contingent valuation literature (Ready, Navrud, and Dubourgh, 2001). 
          The study addresses these issues by analyzing yield risk perceptions of 
soybean producers from Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa.  The paper utilizes data from 
comprehensive survey mailed to 3,000 corn and soybean producers in the three states 
identified.  In addition to demographic, business, and other basic informational items, 
the survey elicited subjective yield perceptions from respondents under two different 
formats, referred to as direct and indirect approaches.  The purpose of this paper is to 
compare responses between the formats, identify differences, and to provide 
plausible explanations.  The accuracy of each approach is assessed by comparing 
elicited subjective yield values from set of farmers to the county-level yield data 
from which the responses were generated.  So, apart from chapter two which 
examined the influence of cognitive biases on the individual’s decisions to purchase 
crop insurance in the presence of alternative risk management options, this paper 
investigates the role of different elicitation formats on the accuracy of yield 
perceptions by comparing farmers’ perceptions (as a group) to their county yields. 
       The county-level data was used in this analysis because farm-level data for the 
respondents’ were not available.  While this complicates the investigation, note that 
because farm-level data are often not available, the county-level data is used instead, 
in a variety of applications that might influence farmer’s decision making (for 
example, crop insurance is rated at the county level, using county-level yields). 
Therefore, in some cases, the comparison to county-level yields is more relevant than 
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the comparison to the farm-level yields.  In addition, the addendum develops an 
approach that allows one to adjust county-level yields for the higher variability by 
estimating an average ratio of standard deviations of county level and farm level 
yields.   
          The paper contributes to understanding in two areas: accuracy of subjective 
yield perceptions and the role of elicitation format on the accuracy of subjective 
yield perceptions.  The producer’s ability to accurately process yield information has 
significant implications for many purposes – in particular, in cases that require 
farmers to begin with accurate understanding of the probabilities associated with 
some random variables.  Producers routinely rely on their yield perceptions, 
especially when decisions involve risk management, crop insurance, 
marketing/hedging, and others.  Yet, research assessing the accuracy of the 
perceptions is relatively limited (Sherrick, 2002).  Role of elicitation format on the 
accuracy of perceptions is also important.  If one elicitation method is consistently 
more accurate than another, there are obvious implications for survey design and use.  
To aggravate the problem further, the yield elicitation methods are commonly used 
in isolation in surveys, making comparison of elicitation methods challenging.  By 
examining the subjective perceptions elicited under different formats from the same 
respondent, the paper addresses an issue in existing research that has not been 
extensively targeted in the past.   
Literature Review 
Most of the literature on risk perceptions in agricultural economics is related to yield 
perceptions, and particularly, to the correspondence between subjective and objective 
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yields.  Because underlying assumptions regarding the true data-generation process 
for crop yields are very important for the comparison of subjective and objective 
yields, crop yield distributions (parametric and non-parametric) have been 
extensively analyzed.  For example, Nelson and Preckel (1989) used beta distribution, 
while Jung and Ramezani (1999) used lognormal distribution.  Others, such as Ker 
and Goodwin (2000) used non-parametric distributions.  Sherrick, Zanini, Schnitkey, 
and Irwin (2004a) analyzed implications of using different distributional forms to 
model yields using farm-level data for corn and soybeans.  They detrended yields 
using a linear trend (unit root test showed that yields time series were not stochastic), 
and fitted normal, logistic, Weibull, beta, and lognormal distributions, and assessed 
the fit using the Anderson-Darling and likelihood tests.  The results indicated that the 
Weibull provided a suitable representation for the crop yields.  Further, the flexibility 
of the Weibull makes it attractive as a measure across a wide set of moments 
conditions.   
          While the subjective beliefs are important in forming expectations and making 
decision, the number of articles that analyzed the producers’ subjective beliefs in 
agriculture is limited.  The second chapter of this dissertation analyzed the role of the 
misperception biases in insurance-purchasing decisions.  Results showed that the 
BTA effect is present in farmers’ decision making, since majority of farmers were 
overstating their yields in relation to the county average.  The results from the 
regression analysis indicated that the variables for age, likelihood to receive an 
indemnity, diversification, and usage of alternative risk management tools were 
significant in determining the demand for crop insurance.  However, none of proxies 
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for the biases were significant, suggesting that farmers are rational in crop insurance 
decisions, and that the biases could a product of elicitation format.   
        Sherrick (2002), using a conviction weights approach (probabilistic approach), 
elicited subjective distribution for precipitation and compared the parameterized 
subjective distribution to the parameterized actual rainfall distribution.  Sherrick 
found that farmers tend to overstate average precipitation levels for April rainfall and 
understate average precipitation for July rainfall.  Similarly, he found that farmers 
tend to understate the precipitation variability for July rainfall, and overstate the 
variability for April rainfall.  Eales, Engel, Hauser, and Thompson (1990) elicited 
subjective distribution for options and futures prices from various market 
participants and, assuming lognormal distribution compared the prices to actual 
market values.  They found that while their reported subjective means agreed in most 
cases with corresponding market values, the respondents’ reported subjective 
variances were significantly smaller than their market estimates.  Pease (1993) 
elicited yield distributions from corn and soybean producers and compared them 
with producers’ production history.  Using subjective means as a forecast, he 
compared the means with linearly detrended farm-level historical yields.  He reports 
that while subjective means were slightly higher for soybeans, they were lower for 
corn.  He also reports that producers significantly underestimated yield risk.  
Similarly, Bessler (1980) elicited yield distribution from farmers using conviction 
weights or probabilistic approach.  Aggregating the subjective yield distributions and 
comparing the resulting values with the ARIMA forecast (derived based on actual 
yields), he reported no significant differences between the forecast and subjective 
 86 
mean values.  He also noted that subjective forecasts tend to display a greater 
variability.  Using a format similar survey to the one employed here, Egelkraut, 
Sherrick, Garcia, and Pennings (2006a) elicited subjective crop distribution from 
Illinois corn producers.  They elicited subjective yields directly (by asking farmers to 
state their average yield and yield variability in relation to the typical farm in the 
county) and indirectly (by asking farmers to assign weights to yield intervals) and 
compared these estimates to the county-level data.  They found that the differences 
between county averages and directly stated yields were statistically significant.  
Also, the differences between indirectly elicited measures and directly elicited 
measures were significant as well, while differences between county estimates and 
indirect estimates for mean and variability were not statistically significant.  Nerlove 
and Bessler (2001) provide an overview of the studies that examined correspondence 
between respondents’ expectations (elicited in surveys among other methods) 
regarding economic variables to the objective representation of these variables.  
Major findings of their overview were as follows.  First, the result indicated that 
aggregated individual expectations approximated objective data better than 
individual expectations.  Second, respondents displayed a significant heterogeneity 
in their expectations.  Third, respondents were capable of identifying underlying data 
generation process (i.e. random walk versus autoregressive pattern) but did not 
always optimally incorporated the process into the expectations and forecast. 
       Overall, the results from past literature suggest that farmers (as a group) possess 
reasonably accurate subjective estimates of mean and less accurate estimates of yield 
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variability.  In addition, the findings indicate that indirectly elicited yields provide a 
more accurate representation then directly-elicited yields. 
          In addition to the publications in agricultural economics, the literature related 
to contingent valuation might provide insights toward a better understanding of the 
role that elicitation format plays in recovering subjective beliefs.  In contingent 
valuation studies, information on donations is usually elicited in two ways: through 
dichotomous choice (“Would you pay X for Y?” type of questions) and traditional 
payment card, where individuals are asked to choose among several choices of 
payment amounts.  It has been observed in the literature that the donations elicited 
through dichotomous choice tend to exceed actual donations, resulting in an upward 
bias, which has been referred to as a “hypothetical bias” (Champ and Bishop, 2001), 
while donations elicited through more continuous elicitation methods such as the 
payment card tended to be lower and more in line with actual donations.  It also has 
been noticed that respondents in dichotomous-choice type questions tended to be less 
certain about their answers.  For example, Champ and Bishop (2001) after eliciting 
responses in dichotomous-choice, followed up with “How certain are you that you 
would (would not) donate the requested amount?” with a response scale ranging 
from 1 (very uncertain) to 10 (very certain).  They compared the responses to the 
second sample where respondents actually donated money.  The results indicated 
that the donation amount elicited through dichotomous-choice has exceeded actual 
amount donated.  Also the proportion of the respondents who stated that they would 
donate certain amount and are very certain to donate (10 on the scale) was similar to 
the proportion that actually donated money.  Ready, Navrud, and Dubourgh (2001) 
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argued that the differences between two methods could be explained by “how unsure 
respondents answer these two types of questions.” (pg 325).  Under dichotomous-
choice, the respondents who are not completely sure of their answers would be 
classified as “yes”, because the question usually asks “would you pay X amount for 
Y?”  This does not happen under continuous choice because respondents are given 
choices and therefore, could be more specific in their answers.  In other words, 
dichotomous choice might classify some of the “may be” answers as “yes”, resulting 
in an upward bias.  Ready, Navrud, and Dubourgh (2001) reported that the 
differences between two elicitation methods were reduced if the respondents under 
dichotomous choice were elicited certainty level (i.e. “I am 95% certain that I would 
pay X amount for Y.”), and the answers were controlled for it.  The obvious question 
that arises from these findings is whether the differences in elicitation formats play a 
similar role in elicitations of other variables, such as yield perceptions.    
         Given the limited research, the need for further analysis of producers’ 
perceptions is evident.  Various audiences can gain from more a detailed analysis of 
subjective yield elicitation.  Findings can be helpful for researchers and survey users 
since, direct elicitation of mean yield and yield variability is used extensively in 
research; see for example Shaik, Coble, and Knight (2005).  If different elicitation 
formats lead to different responses, the discrepancies need to be accounted for in 
survey designs and use. To date, only Egelkraut et al.(2006b) is known to have 
considered directly and indirectly elicited yields elicitation in the same survey.  This 
study represents improvement over Egelkraut et al. (2006b) work by examining the 
 89 
yield differences from different elicitation formats as function of age, education, size 
using a bigger sample and a different crop.      
Survey Description  
The study uses data from a crop yield risk survey, which was conducted under a 
cooperative agreement with the Economic Research Service USDA and supported by 
the Risk Management Agency of USDA.  While the survey is described in detail in 
the second paper, elicitation methods used in the survey need additional discussion.  
Yield perceptions for soybeans were elicited directly and indirectly, in separate 
sections of the survey.  The partitioning of these two sections was done by design to 
separate task and context.  For the indirect section, the perceptions were elicited by 
asking respondents to assign probabilities into the predefined yield categories (figure 
3.1).  This probabilistic approach, known as the conviction weights approach (Norris 
and Kramer 1990), was employed by Bessler (1980) and Eales et al. (1990).  The 
sum of the intervals was identified as 100%, requiring respondents’ stated 
probabilities to sum to 100%, and readjust interval weights until probability is fully 
assigned.   
         Farmers’ yield perceptions were also elicited by directly asking respondents to 
indicate whether their yields are above primary county average (if yes, by how many 
bushels), below the county average (if yes, by how many bushels), or the same as the 
county average (figure 3.2 shows that part of the survey).  Besides eliciting average 
yield, the survey elicited yield variability by asking a respondent to state whether 
respondent’s subjective yields are more variable than county average, less variable 
than county average, or have the same degree of variability.   
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Methods  
The directly-stated subjective yield averages were estimated as follows.  If a 
respondent indicated that his farm-individual yield is not different from county 
average, his directly-stated yield average was set equal to the county average (since 
the survey asked a respondent to refer to his county average).  If the respondent 
indicated that his yield is below/above the average, the directly stated yield was 
coded as the county average yield minus/plus the stated difference.  
          In the indirectly-stated yield section, discrete probabilities were used to both 
calculate implied weighted averages and to convert each individual response set was 
to a continuous subjective yield distribution using:    
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where pij - producer i stated probability for interval j  
           Uij – upper bound of the interval 
           D(.) – cumulative distribution of farm-level yields  
           iθ  - set of parameters for producer i’s subjective yield
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          Distribution functions for Weibull, normal, and lognormal distributions were 
fitted.  Results are presented for the Weibull distribution because 1) it provides the 
best fit22 and 2) to take advantage of useful properties of the Weibull distribution for 
modeling crop yields including its non-symmetry, zero limit, and wide range of 
skewness and kurtosis.  The CDF of the Weibull has the following functional form: 
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The implied mean and implied standard deviation are then calculated under the fitted 
distributions for each farmer and used as proxies for the indirectly-stated average 
yield and yield variability.   
         The county distribution was used as a representative objective yield distribution 
from the location indicated in the response as the primary county.  Soybean county 
yields were obtained from NASS for the years 1972-2002 and detrended to 2002 (the 
survey date) using a linear trend at county level (Sherrick et al. (2004a)) found that 
yields series tend to be stationary with s strong upward trend due to improved seed 
technology).  To estimate parameters for continuous distributional form equation (5) 
was minimized; 
( )2 2
,
min | , ( | , )fit fitα β
µ µ α β σ σ α β− + −             (5) 
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Where µ  is equal to the county mean.   
            fitµ  is the fitted county mean 
            σ  is the county standard deviation 
            fitσ  is the fitted county standard deviation 
            ,α β  are the Weibull parameters for fitted distribution  
Solving (5) for ,α β  provides Weibull parameters for a continuous county yield 
distribution with objective mean and objective standard deviation. 
Survey Data  
Of the 930 surveys returned, 896 were sufficiently complete to be usable, producing 
a usable response rate of approximately 29%.  This response rate exceeded (as 
indicated by Progressive Farmer) anticipated total response rate of 15% to 20%.  
Because soybean distribution intervals in the survey’s subjective distribution section 
provided a better range for actual yield than the intervals for the corn distribution, 
only soybean subjective distributions were used in the analysis.  As a result of this 
selection criterion, the sample could include soybean producers who might/might not 
be corn producers.   
         Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for various farm characteristics for a raw 
data sample (containing 930 observations) and a cleaned data sample (containing 382 
observations).  Various criteria were applied to the raw data sample that resulted in 
elimination of the observations.  If an observation had sum of the yield distribution 
intervals less than 90% or more than 110%, it was eliminated (the observations with 
greater than 90% or above 100% were rescaled by norming to their own sum).  This 
restriction eliminated 212 observations, with the majority of the eliminated 
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observations having all yield intervals fields blank.  The observations with less then 
3 yield intervals were eliminated as well, resulting in 85 eliminated observations.  
Such observations led to unreasonably high/low distribution moments.  The 
observations with more than one primary county (i.e. the county where a producers 
mainly operates) were eliminated as well, resulting in 97 eliminated observations.  
This restriction was imposed because farm-level yields would need to be compared 
to specific (primary) county yields.  Seventy one observations were eliminated 
because they did not contain information on state or primary county (i.e. the fields 
were left blank).  Finally, eliminating missing observations for the variables used in 
the analysis (age, education, debt, and so on) led to the elimination of 83 
observations.  These eliminations resulted in a clean survey sample of 382 
observations.  Because the raw data sample contains observations with missing 
state/county fields, the characteristics for the raw sample were not sorted by state.   
         Table 3.1 shows average and standard deviation for raw and cleaned sample.  
The standard deviations were not available for the proportions (for example, 
proportion of farmers who graduated from high school).  The farm sizes are similar 
in the both samples; however, size in a raw sample has higher standard deviation.  
Percentage of farmers with debt is higher in the raw sample, there are more insurance 
users and more farmers own land in the clean sample (as owned to total acres much 
higher).   
        The state comparison of a clean sample leads to the following conclusions.  
Indiana has the largest farms in the sample and the youngest users, while Iowa has 
the smallest size farms, with highest percentage of livestock sales.     
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        Equation 1 is used to estimate parameters for each of the candidate 
distributional forms.  Figure 3.3 shows an example of the fitted subjective and 
county soybean yield distributions for Fayette County, Iowa, (the county and farmers 
from each county were selected for illustration purposes only).  As the figure 
suggests, producers in the county display various yield expectations.  Respondent 1 
has a lower subjective mean and smaller variance, while respondent 2 has higher 
mean and smaller yield variability. 
Results  
Table 3.2 summarizes the direct assessments of individual-farm yields by respondent.  
The majority of respondents indicated that their yields are greater than the county 
average (53% in Iowa, 57% in Indiana, and 60% in Illinois), or equal to county 
average (38% in Iowa, 41% in Indiana, and 31% in Illinois).  Similarly, the majority 
of the respondents viewed their yield variability to be smaller than the county 
average (41% in Iowa, 48% in Indiana, and 47% in Illinois) or equal to the county 
average (39% in Iowa, 37% in Indiana, and 43 in Illinois).  Approximately 79% of 
farmers reported both less than or equal yield variability and same or greater average 
yields.    
         To contrast these results with the indirect method, table 3.3 contains a summary 
of the directly-stated yields, indirectly-stated yields (Weibull implied), county 
average yields, the differences between directly-stated yields and county averages, 
and the differences between indirectly stated yields and county averages for each 
state.  The average directly-stated yield for Iowa is 49.09 bu/ac (50.02 bu/ac for 
Indiana, 49.95 bu/ac for Illinois), which is 6.8 bu/ac greater than the weighted county 
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average (8.38 bu/ac bu/ac for Indiana, 6.75 bu/ac for Illinois) and 3.69 bu/ac greater 
than indirectly-stated for Iowa (5.06 bu/ac for Indiana, 3.91 bu/ac for Illinois).  The 
corresponding differences between indirectly-stated and the county average yields 
are 0.21, -0.49, 0.57, and 0.24 bu/ac.  The paired t-test23 for the differences between 
the directly-stated and county average yields indicated that the differences are 
statistically significant while no such significance was detected in yield differences 
between indirectly stated and county average. 24 Figure 3.4 illustrates the frequency 
count of the differences between indirectly-elicited subjective yields and county 
average yields for the respondents in each state.  Overall, the mean differences 
appear reasonably distributed, with subjective means being slightly greater than 
county average means  
          This significance suggests that the farmers, as a group, display the “better-
than-average” effect when yields are directly elicited.  On the other hand, the 
differences between indirectly-stated yields and county average yields were not 
statistically significant suggesting that farmers as a group, display well-calibrated 
mean yield perceptions when yields are elicited in a probabilistic framework.     
          Contrary to the earlier directly-stated yields analysis, the results from 
indirectly-stated yields analysis suggest that systematic differences do not exist 
between subjective yield distribution and its objective counterpart, and subjective 
yields assessed in probabilistic framework provide more accurate estimates of yield.  
The effect disappears when the yield distribution is elicited from the farmers 
indirectly.   
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          The observed discrepancies are an example is the “better than average” (BTA) 
effect.  The BTA effect refers to an individual propensity to “judge themselves as 
better than others with regard to skills or positive attributes.” (Glaser and Weber, 
2003).  Since yields could be viewed as an assessment of producer’s farming skills, it 
is natural to expect such yield exaggeration from a farmer (Taylor and Brown, 1998).  
What is not clear, however, is why the BTA effect is not observed in the probabilistic 
yield assessment.  After all, it is possible for a farmer to assign weights to the higher 
yield intervals, thus increasing the mean of the yield distribution.   
        Recall that findings from contingent valuation literature were cited earlier with 
similar results reported.  After all, the respondents who overstated their donations in 
the dichotomous choice could have overstated their donations in the payment card as 
well.   The proposed explanation by the contingent valuation literature is 
dichotomous-choice questions result in an upward bias as the respondents tend to be 
less certain in answering discrete-choice type question than answering continuous 
choice or open end questions (see for example Champ and Bishop, 2001).  We make 
related argument by hypothesizing that the “unsureness” in our case could be a 
function of task complexity.  Answering direct yield elicitation questions (i.e.“Is 
your yield above/same/below county average”) is an easy task; it does not require a 
significant mental effort.  As a result, some respondents might provide answers they 
are not sure about or have not evaluated carefully.  However, as a task-complexity 
increases, as in estimating yield intervals for example, these respondents might be 
forced to consider entire distribution of the variable of interest and as a result 
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carefully assess their choices.  Note that the yield discrepancy could also be driven 
by other factors, such as age, farm size (examined later in the section)25.      
         These results are consistent with findings from the previous literature.  In 
particular, the results are in agreement with the second paper’s findings, where 
Weibull implied yields were not statistically different from county average yields.  
These conclusions are also in line with findings by Nerlove and Bessler (2001), 
Bessler (1980) and Eales et al. (1990) who did not find significant differences 
between objectives and aggregated subjective estimates, and Egelkraut et al.(2006a) 
who did not find statistically significant differences between county mean and 
individual implied means.  Furthermore, Egelkraut et al.(2006a) argued that farmers 
are likely to recall yields in more recent years rather then yields in more distant years.  
If a farmer experienced several favorable years, he is more likely to overstate the 
yield in his direct yield statements.  This hypothesis is examined by constructing 
averages using 5 years (from 2002 to 1998) and 10 years (from 2002 to1993) of 
NASS county-level yields.  While the average differences between directly-stated 
and 5 and 10 year averages were smaller (5 year average: IA=5.6 bu/ac, IN=4.7 
bu/ac, IL=4.3 bu/ac, 10 year average IA=2.7 bu/ac, IN=4.3 bu/ac, IL=3.9 bu/ac) than 
the differences reported in table 3.3, these differences remained statistically 
significant at p<0.0001.  These findings are consistent with Egelkraut et al. (2006a), 
who reported similar results for corn producers.         
          To examine the correspondence between subjective perception and objective 
measures of yield risk, the implied and county average standard deviations were also 
compared.  If a farmer assesses the yield risk accurately, his measure of yield 
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variability should be greater than county-level variability, because aggregated yields 
tend to be less volatile than individual yields.  Results from a paired t-test suggest 
that implied standard deviations (IA = 8.03 bu/ac, IN = 7.63 bu/ac, IL = 7.33 bu/ac) 
are statistically different (p<0.0001) from county-level standard deviations (IA = 
4.87 bu/ac, IN = 4.81 bu/ac, IL = 4.70 bu/ac).  As expected, the farm variability 
measures were larger then their county counterparts.  Figure 3.5 illustrates the 
frequency count of the differences between indirectly-elicited subjective yields and 
county average standard deviations for the respondents in each state.  While the bin 
containing zero has the greatest frequency, the subjective standard deviations tend to 
be larger than county yield standard deviations 
         The findings differ somewhat from those presented by Eales, et al. and 
Egelkraut, et al.(2006b), whose results suggested apparent overconfidence.  In 
particular, Egelkraut et al. (2006b)reported that corn producers’ subjective standard 
deviations were not statistically different from county-level standard deviations.  The 
discrepancy in the findings might be attributed to the differences in crops (Egelkraut 
et al. (2006b) used subjective perceptions of corn producers, while this paper uses 
subjective perceptions of soybean farmers), as the ratio of farm-level to countywide 
risk for soybean yields tend to be slightly greater than the same ratio for corn yields.      
         The reported discrepancy between directly-elicited yields and county-level 
yields could also be a function of various characteristic such as farmer’s education 
level, farm size, experience, and etc.  For example, more experienced farmer could 
possess more accurate yield perceptions.  To investigate this claim, following 
equation is estimated:  
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7YD SIZE AGE EDU IN IL IA SSDβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + +  (6) 
Where YD is the difference between means of directly elicited yields and county 
average yields, SIZE is size of the farm, AGE is respondent’s age, EDU is 
respondent’s education level (discrete variable, 1 denoting high school graduate, and 
4 denoting graduate school graduate), IN, IL, and IA are dummy variables for states, 
and SSD is implied (subjective) standard deviation.  Also, following variations of the 
equations (6) were tested: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7YDD SIZE AGE EDU IN IL IA SSDβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + +  (7) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7YV SIZE AGE EDU IN IL IA SSDβ β β β β β β β= + + + + + + +   (8) 
Where YDD was decoded as 1 if directly elicited yields were greater than county 
average yields 0 otherwise in equation 7, and YV was decoded as 1 if a farmer 
indicated that the yields had the same/less variability then county yields and 0 if the 
yields were more variable then county yields.   
         The results from this test are shown in table 3.4.  Equation 6 is estimated as 
model 1, equation 7 and 8, as models 2 and 3 respectively.  None of the variables for 
the regression is significant and an F-test for overall significance suggests that 
coefficients jointly are not significantly different from zero.  The results indicate that 
none of the considered variables explain the discrepancies observed.  It is of course, 
still possible that other variables not captured in this survey (risk aversion for 
example), could explain the relationship.                                     
Conclusion  
This paper uses subjective yield perceptions elicited in two different formats from 
soybean producers in Illinois, Iowa, and Indiana, and compares them to county-level 
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data.  The results suggest that subjective yield perceptions elicited in a probabilistic 
framework can provide a more reliable yield assessment of county-level yield data, 
in particular with regard to a central tendency, and farmers as a group possess well-
calibrated yield expectations.  In addition, the findings indicate that the probabilistic 
elicitation approach is more accurate than direct yield elicitation at representing 
county-level yield data and that the BTA effect observed in directly-elicited 
subjective yields could be due to the elicitation format.  The results suggested that 
the aggregated indirectly-elicited farm-level yields were not different from the 
county average yields, which is consistent with the second paper, with Nerlove and 
Bessler (2001), Bessler (1980), Eales et al. (1990), and Egelkraut et al. (2006b).  
However, unlike Eales et al. and Egelkraut et al. (2006b) no evidence of the 
overconfidence is found when subjective standard deviation is compared with 
county-level standard deviations.   
         The results are consistent with the findings from contingent valuation literature 
that indicated that the dichotomous-choice type questions have an upward bias that is 
not present in the continuous or open-end type questions.  We argue that the 
observed BTA effect could be due to task-complexity.  As task complexity of 
elicitation format increases from direct elicitation to probabilistic assessment, 
respondents are forced to carefully evaluate their responses and to provide more 
accurate assessments.  Future research could test this hypothesis through yield 
elicitation under gradually increasing complexity of the elicitation formats.  The 
major implication of this paper for researchers is that care should be exercised in 
interpreting and using directly-elicited yields as true measures of producers’ beliefs.  
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Addendum  
The purpose of this addendum is to introduce an approach that allows for an 
adjustment of county-level yields for the higher variability of farm-level yields.  The 
approach is implemented in Schnitkey Sherrick, and Irwin (2003), where the ratio of 
farm-level variability to county-level variability (scaler) was estimated, the county 
level standard deviations were multiplied by this scaler to account for the higher 
level of variability.  Schnitkey, Sherrick, and Irwin estimated the scaler using FBFM 
data, by detrending farm-level yields, and estimating the average (at the state level) 
ratio of county level to farm level yields.   
          We adopted a similar approach and calculated the scaler values using two 
methods.  Firstly, the scaler was calculated using actual farmer data from farms 
enrolled in the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) record-keeping 
system, by detrending farm level yields (soybean yields from 1987 to 2002), and 
estimating the average (at the state level) ratio of county level yield standard 
deviation to farm level yield standard deviation.  Secondly, the scaler was estimated 
by calculating the ratio of subjective standard deviation (as implied by subjective 
yield distribution from survey respondents) to objective (county level) standard 
deviation.  Because the FBFM has records for Illinois farms only, the survey sample 
was limited to Illinois producers as well.  The purpose of calculating the scaler using 
two different approaches is the comparison of the resulting values.  If the survey’s 
respondents possess well-calibrated beliefs, then the two scaler values should 
correspond to each other.   
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          Table 3.5 shows scaler statistics from both approaches.  The second column 
shows scaler statistics estimated using survey data and the third column shows scaler 
statistics estimated using FBFM data.  The average value for subjective scaler is 1.67, 
for FBFM scaler the average is 1.52, the difference of 0.15.  The subjective scaler 
has larger dispersion as measured by standard deviation and minimum and maximum 
values.  Given the difference of 0.15 between the scalers, one can say that there is a 
close correspondence between the scaler values.         
Endnotes 
 
21 The optimization was implemented in Excel, by minimizing differences between 
farmer’s stated probabilities and specified fitted distribution for each interval by 
changing fitted distribution parameters. 
22  The results confirm that the Weibull distribution provides the best overall fit by 
displaying smallest sum of squared errors (41,213) across all surveys, followed by 
the normal (47,502) and lognormal (633,360) distributions. 
23  Because farmers' subjective means are paired to the county means where 
producers farm, such samples are likely to be dependent.  To account for this, a 
paired t-test was used (Bluman, 2001).  Note that t-test assumes that underlying 
observations are normally distributed.  To account for the possible non-normality, 
Wilcoxon test was used as well.        
24 Paired t-test and Wilcoxon test were conducted on two levels.  First, individual 
farmer’s subjective means were paired to the respective county means and critical 
test values were calculated.  Second, county-average subjective means were 
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calculated (equally weighted)  and paired with respective county means.  In both 
cases, the differences between subjective and objective means were statistically 
significant at p>0.001.           
25 The discrepancy could also be the result of sample selection bias.  However, in this 
case, one would expect the selection bias manifest itself in both elicitation formats.   
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Figures and Tables  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Survey section that elicited indirectly-stated yield perceptions 
          
Corn-Yield range Probability Soybeans- Yield Range Probability 
Less than 40 bu/acre  Less than 10 bu/acre  
41 to 60 bu/acre  11 to 20 bu/acre  
61 to 80 bu/acre  21 to 30 bu/acre  
81 to 100 bu/acre  31 to 40 bu/acre  
101 to 120 bu/acre  41 to 50 bu/acre  
121 to 140 bu/acre  51 to 60 bu/acre  
141 to 160 bu/acre  61 to 70 bu/acre  
More than 160 bu/acre  More than 70 bu/acre  
Total (Should sum to 100%) 100% Total (Should sum to 100%) 100% 
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Figure 3.2. Survey section that elicited directly-stated yield perceptions 
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 Figure 3.3. Subjective and county PDFs for Fayette county Iowa soybean producers 
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Table 3.4. Regression results  
 Model 1: Yield 
Difference 
(Subjective - 
Objective Mean) 
Model 2: Yield Mean 
(1 if above county 
average, 0 below) 
Model 3: Yield 
Variability (1 if less or 
as variable then county 
average, 0 below) 
 Coefficients
a
 Coefficients
a
 Coefficients
a
 
Intercept 5.61367* 0.97256* 0.94782* 
SIZE 0.00103 0.00003 0.00004 
AGE -0.02706 -0.0009 -0.00064 
EDU -0.49932 0.0048 -0.02849 
IA -0.51656 -0.06089 -0.05044 
IL 0.07491 -0.06266 0.06428 
SSD 0.04937 0.00044 -0.00748 
Ajd R2 0.00215 -0.00638 0.01314 
F(7, 382) 1.30745 0.76533 2.02008* 
a Significantly greater than zero at p<0.05(*), p<0.01(**) and p<0.001 (***). 
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Table 3.5. Subjective and objective scalers calculated using survey  
(Illinois producers) and FBFM data (averages, at state level)  
 Scaler Scaler Difference 
 
Subjective 
(Survey) FBFM Survey - FBFM 
Average 1.67 1.52 0.15 
Min 0.74 0.62 -1.54 
Max 4.03 3.03 2.42 
St.Dev 0.62 0.54 0.83 
Count 137 1054 - 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine factors that affect farmers’ 
participation in crop insurance programs.  In particular, the dissertation examined the 
impact from RMA rules on the participation and relationship between farmers’ 
perceptions and crop insurance purchasing decisions.  The first chapter analyzed the 
impact of RMA’s rules on the performance, participation, and risk protection level of 
APH insurance, using NASS county-level yield data.  The second chapter 
investigated the role of the misperception biases in insurance-purchasing decisions in 
presence of risk management tools.  The third chapter considered correspondence 
between subjective yield perceptions recovered under different elicitation formats 
and county-level yields.     
        The findings revealed a series of insights explaining the relationship between 
participation, RMA rules, and farmers’ perceptions.  Examination of RMA rules that 
omit trend and sample size variability revealed that the current rules create a 
significant lag in yields (relatively to the expected yields) leading to the lower 
protection levels under APH yields (reductions from 16% to 34% depending on the 
length of the APH period).  Results also suggested the presence of adverse selection 
as probability of APH yield being greater than expected yields ranged from 10% to 
33% depending on APH base period.  The results also revealed that the current RMA 
premiums exceed actuarial costs even after controlling for catastrophic loading by 
factor of 1.8 to 2.3.  The lag in yields along with the resulting declines in protection 
levels and increases in the premiums relatively to the actuarial costs, explain the 
farmers’ reluctance to participate in the crop insurance program and justify current 
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provision of subsidies.  The approach toward adjusting yields for the trend is 
suggested that has potential to improve the protection levels and reduce RMA 
premiums in relation to the actuarial costs.  Implementing this adjustment would not 
require changes in the current rating structure and has potential improving 
participation and actuarial performance of the crop insurance.     
          The examination of the econometric results from demand model provides 
further insights into farmers’ behavior.  The results illustrated that age increases 
probability of participation for revenue and CAT insurance, and decrease the 
probability for yield insurance.  Leverage increases the probability of participation 
for revenue and CAT insurance products, while farm size decreases the probability 
for all insurance products.  Diversification (measured as sales of livestock) decreases 
the likelihood of purchase across all insurance products, and the probability of 
receiving insurance payments increases the likelihood for the use of yield and 
revenue insurance, and decreases it for CAT insurance.  This significance is 
consistent with the results from simulation model that showed presence of adverse 
selection.  Results also suggested that farmers who had used other risk management 
tools before are more likely to participate in crop insurance program as well.  An 
implication could be that RMA should consider providing discounts for a continuous 
use of crop insurance, and target farmers who actively use other risk management 
tools.  Accounting for trend and bringing more farmers through effective targeting 
(both in terms of risk management usage and age) could mitigate adverse selection.   
        Results also showed presence of the BTA effect in directly elicited yields while 
revealing no such relationship for yield elicited under probabilistic framework.  
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However, the econometric results showed no relationship between subjective yields 
and crop insurance purchase, suggesting that the BTA effect could be due mainly to 
the elicitation format.  We argued that direct elicitation does not require significant 
mental efforts and may be viewed as less serious by the subjects, and as a result 
directly-elicited yields tend to be less reliable.  While results suggested little 
relationship between BTA effect and participation, further training and education 
might benefit farmers by making farmers aware of the bias.   
          The findings presented here are as with all empirical studies, subject to the 
data and methods limitations.  Future examinations of RMA rules for trend and 
sample size variability might benefit greatly from incorporating spatial analysis of 
crop yields, since spatial element in yields is likely to play a significant role in 
determining yield trend and variability.  Furthermore, continuous improvement in 
seed varieties is likely to impact trend and sample size variability further.  In 
particular, for the behavioral implications, future analysis will benefit from a more 
detailed examination of the factors that determine the discrepancies between 
objective and subjective yield elicited in the probabilistic framework and subjective 
yields elicited using open-ended questions.  The future analyses of risk perceptions 
and crop insurance participation would benefit from inclusion of more psychological 
variables (such as risk aversion for example) in econometric demand models and 
extending the analyses to different crops and geographical regions.   
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